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Executive summary/Abstract  
BACKGROUND  
Corporate crime is a poorly understood problem with little known about effective 
strategies to prevent and control it.  Competing definitions of corporate crime affect 
how the phenomenon is studied and implications for reducing it.  Therefore, in this 
review, we use John Braithwaite’s definition (1984: 6) which specifies that corporate 
crime is “the conduct of a corporation, or of employees acting on behalf of a 
corporation, which is proscribed and punishable by law.”   Consistent with this 
approach, this review focuses on various legal strategies aimed at companies and their 
officials/managers to curtail corporate crime. Interventions may be punitive or 
cooperative, but the goal is to prevent offending and increase levels of corporate 
compliance.  
  
OBJECTIVES  
Our overall objective is to identify and synthesize published and unpublished studies on 
formal legal and administrative prevention and control strategies—i.e., the actions and 
programs of government law enforcement agencies, legislative bodies, and regulatory 
agencies on corporate crime.  We then assess the impact of these strategies on 
individual and company offending.  Included are legal and administrative interventions 
such as new laws or changes in laws, inspections by regulatory agencies, punitive 
sanctions and non-punitive interventions aimed at deterring or controlling illegal 
behaviors.   
 
CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION OF STUDIES  
We were highly inclusive in our selection criteria, including studies that encompass a 
wide variety of methodologies: experimental (e.g., lab studies or vignette surveys), 
quasi-experimental (e.g., pre/post-tests), and non-experimental (e.g., correlational 
statistics using secondary data).  The studies included also contained a wide variety of 
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data (e.g., data from official agencies, corporate reports, individuals’ survey responses, 
etc.).  Our search included published and unpublished articles, reports, documents, and 
other readily available sources.  The outcome of interest, corporate offending, could 
reflect actual behavior or behavioral intentions as reported by respondents. 
 
SEARCH STRATEGY  
Our search strategy included numerous online databases and other sources (41 in total) 
to identify published and unpublished studies consistent with our definition of 
corporate crime.  Sixty-nine search terms were generated to conduct the search, 
including specific terms associated with corporate offending (misconduct, corruption, 
unethical conduct, and organizational crime), offense type, and legal/regulatory 
strategies.  For each database and search term, we tracked the number of “hits” gleaned 
from the search and determined whether the article related to corporate crime 
deterrence (broadly defined) and if there was quantitative evidence that might be coded 
for a systematic review.  Studies meeting both criteria were considered “potentially 
eligible” and went through the next phase of eligibility coding.   
  
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS  
This research proceeded in two phases—the first phase (through 2003) collected studies 
of any intervention type (legal and otherwise) that focused on corporate crime 
prevention and control.  The second phase of the project focused exclusively on 
prevention and control strategies solely in the legal area.  Reflecting the broader focus of 
the first phase, we created a coding protocol that included the entire domain of 
corporate crime prevention/deterrence research which included the specific treatment 
variables we are interested in here—legal restraints.  Two hundred and sixty five studies 
were eligible for inclusion.  From each included study, we coded various forms of data 
classified into and calculated multiple types of effect sizes. These included 1) the 
“standardized mean-difference effect size” for analyses comparing two groups’ 
performance on a continuous outcome, 2) the “product-moment correlation effect size” 
for relationships in which both the independent variable and dependent variable are 
continuous (or assumed to represent a continuous construct), and 3) the “Odds-Ratio 
Effect Size” when both the independent and dependent variables involved are 
dichotomous.  Interventions were classified into six treatments and broken down by 
subgroups (unit of analysis and whether the design was cross-sectional or longitudinal).  
We also conducted moderator analyses. 
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MAIN RESULTS  
Out of the 40 possible treatment categories, we were able to calculate a mean effect size 
for 19.  Although most showed a positive albeit non-significant treatment effect, some 
(including a significant effect) were iatrogenic.  Looking at the specific mechanisms, the 
impact of law on corporate crime showed a modest deterrent effect at the firm and 
geographical level of analysis (there was not enough data to calculate effect sizes for 
individuals).  However, this finding is limited to cross-sectional studies.  For punitive 
sanctions, where there was substantially more data from which to calculate effect 
sizes, we observe a similar pattern: A tendency toward deterrence across units of 
analysis, with relatively few significant effects regardless of whether data are cross-
sectional or longitudinal.  The one area where there appears to be a consistent 
treatment effect is in the area of regulatory policy, but only at the individual level.  
Effects for other levels are contradictory (with some positive and others iatrogenic) and 
none are statistically significant. Regarding moderator effects, the least 
methodologically rigorous designs— those that were not experimental versus 
experimental designs and those without statistical control variables versus controls 
were associated with a treatment effect.  We also found that older studies were 
associated with stronger deterrent effects—perhaps because the older studies are less 
methodologically rigorous that those that are newer.  Other moderator results were less 
clear (publication bias, country bias, disciplinary bias; offense type), but given how few 
of the analyses revealed strong treatment effects overall we think it is premature to draw 
any conclusions from these findings and call instead for more methodologically rigorous 
and focused studies particularly in the punitive sanction and regulatory policy areas. 
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1 Background for the Review 
 
Few subject areas span as many disciplinary boundaries as does corporate crime.  Since 
Sutherland’s famous Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association in 
1939 (1940) and subsequent publication of White Collar Crime ten years later, business 
scholars, economists, sociologists, political scientists, lawyers, and psychologists, and 
criminologists have speculated not just about the etiological origins of corporate crime 
but about the success of various strategies for its prevention and control.  The recent 
global financial crisis has, once again, brought the problem of white-collar crime to the 
attention of the media, general public, and policy-makers, but there is still surprisingly 
little systematic and comprehensive data to properly theorize and empirically assess the 
phenomena or to recommend evidence-based policies to prevent and control it.  This 
systematic review is the first of its kind to report and evaluate the empirical evidence on 
corporate crime deterrence strategies.  
 
By corporate crime we mean “the conduct of a corporation, or of employees acting on 
behalf of a corporation, which is proscribed and punishable by law” (Braithwaite, 
1984:6).  Corporate crime, therefore, encompasses a wide array of illegal activities that 
are criminally, civilly, and administratively proscribed and which may be undertaken by 
individual managers/employees as well as by the firm (as an organizational actor) to 
achieve organizational goals.  Corporate crimes are generally distinguished from other 
types of white-collar offenses by the use of organizational resources and by who gains 
from the offense.  Thus, when Raymond Scott Stevenson, head of Tyco’s tax 
department, directed a series of transactions designed to reduce Tyco’s state tax liability 
by back-dating transactions to avoid reporting a $170 million dollar federal capital gain, 
he used organizational resources to “benefit” the company’s bottom line but not 
himself.1
   
 
This distinction between white-collar and corporate offending is by no means 
unambiguous.  For instance, a top manager may utilize organizational resources to 
enrich him or herself--described as “collective embezzlement” by Calavita and Pontell 
                                                        
1  http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/fls/PressReleases/060921-04.html 
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(1991).  In addition, although many acts of corporate crime are undertaken to achieve 
organizational goals, such acts may indirectly benefit the individual through promotion 
or salary bonuses.  However, in accordance with Braithwaite’s definition and consistent 
with our focus on corporate deterrence, we are interested in the kinds of behaviors 
typically characterized as “corporate” and not offenses where the motivation for 
offending largely is personal instead of organizational.   
 
The kinds of offenses that meet our definitional criteria can include the following 
categories of offenses: administrative noncompliance, environmental violations, 
financial violations, labor violations, manufacturing violations, and/or unfair trade 
practices2 (Clinard & Yeager, 1980:113-116).   Similar to classifications of street crimes 
(e.g., violent crimes), each category contains a variety of specific offenses, often with 
distinct statutes that define illegalities and provide remedies and sanctions for violators.  
For instance, unfair trade practices include monopolization, price-fixing, unfair 
advertising, and price discrimination, among other illegal activities (Simpson, 1986).  
The Federal Trade Commission Act, Robinson-Patman Act, and the Sherman-Clayton 
Antitrust Act are some of the more significant pieces of legislation that define what 
constitutes unfair trade practices and the range of penalties for violators. 
Environmental violations are classified by different media (e.g., air, water, land) and 
statutes (e.g., Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act).  Similar to anti-competitive illegality, some of these practices are defined as 
criminal offenses while others fall within the civil and administrative realms.  While 
many corporate offenses are financial, others are “violent” in nature where human lives 
may be lost and individuals injured (for instance, some Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration violations).3
 
   
A key feature of corporate offending is crime complexity.  Although some offenses may 
be quite simple (bribery or Medicare fraud), others often involve multiple 
interconnected actors and organizations, occur over long periods of time, and entail 
manipulating shell companies and billions of dollars (such as Enron).  Corporate crimes 
also vary by seriousness.  Egregious offenses can carry substantial criminal and civil 
                                                        
2 These categories of offenses are particular to the United States.  Other countries, especially in the west, 
may have similar classifications, but the laws and punishments are not necessarily comparable.  In a 
systematic review, it is common that studies from a variety of different countries are included in the 
literature search and subsequent analysis.  This is appropriate since a key goal of meta-analysis is 
generalization over studies to summarize outcomes.  Although our analysis draws from different places with 
distinct laws and practices, our purpose is to evaluate and assess the general impact of laws and sanctions 
on corporate crime.  To gauge whether studies conducted outside of the United States might explain 
differences across studies in the observed outcomes, we conduct a moderator analysis (Section 3.4.3).  
Results of that investigation are described in section 4.3.5. 
3 Workplace safety offenses range from relatively minor violations including failure to report an accident or 
hang a proper safety sign to more serious incidents (e.g., exposure to known toxic substances in the 
workplace without proper training or equipment). 
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sanctions while others are fairly minor “technical” violations such as when a business 
fails to submit a report to a regulatory agency.   
 
Definitional murkiness, breadth, and complexity have made the phenomenon difficult 
to study, but other barriers exist as well.  Perhaps the most salient lies with the lack of 
high quality data.  There is no UCR-like national data base that can be used to 
“measure” the corporate crime problem, nor are there any systematic procedures for 
identifying the “hidden” figure of these crimes (i.e., there is nothing comparable to the 
NCVS).  Most studies of corporate offending are qualitative, ex post facto case study 
investigations of often sensational events.  There are only a handful of systematic 
scientific studies of corporate offending (including Sutherland’s original study) because 
most federal agencies that fund criminological research historically have focused on 
“street” crime.  These agencies are also more apt to fund evaluation research on 
programs and policies in these same areas.  We therefore have learned a great deal 
about the successes or failures of drug courts, pulling levers deterrence strategies, or 
gun seizures, but relatively little about whether corporate crime is deterred through 
criminal prosecution or other intervention strategies.   
 
Because a review of this type has never been conducted, our approach has proceeded 
with a different logic than most systematic reviews.  Instead of beginning with a 
particular intervention in mind (e.g., pulling levers, boot camps, CCTV), it was 
necessary first to examine and assess the kinds of studies that had been conducted to 
determine whether a critical mass of studies could be targeted for assessment and 
evaluation.4 To that end, we conducted an extensive interdisciplinary search of the 
white-collar and corporate offending literatures without regard to specific types of 
corporate crime prevention or intervention strategies (see, Simpson, Laufer, Smith, 
Schell, Powers, Richmond, & Bears, 2008).5
 
  From this effort, we observed that much of 
the extant literature focused on the legal realm--on the influence or effectiveness of 
legal restraints on corporate crime.  Consequently, a systematic review of the empirical 
evidence on the effects of legal remedies (broadly defined) is the subject of this report.  
There are many ways in which the legal domain can prevent and deter corporate crime: 
(1) Laws educate the public about appropriate behavior and dictate the punishments 
that will be meted out should transgressions and discovery occur.  In the corporate 
crime domain, laws such as the Sherman Antitrust Act, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Clean 
                                                        
4 van der laan, Smit, Busshers, and Aarten (2011) adopted a similar approach in their systematic review of 
cross-border trafficking in humans. 
5 This initial study culled documents related to any type of crime control or treatment program, including 
extra-legal strategies such as ethics training and internal compliance programs (see Schell-Busey, 2009), 
the effect of reputational damage (e.g., market penalties) and other extralegal consequences on violations, 
as well as the legal and administrative domains included in the current protocol.      
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Air Act prohibit certain behaviors and set standards for corporate practices.  Violations 
can prompt official reaction (filing a case, prosecution, conviction) and the application 
of sanctions such as fines and corporate probation or, in some instances, the avoidance 
of punishment.  (2) Regulatory policies delimit what firms can and cannot do within a 
particular sphere and compel particular types of behaviors.  When firms fail to meet 
regulatory standards, administrative and civil sanctions may be brought against the 
company.  Although there is sometimes overlap between the different systems of justice 
(criminal, administrative, and civil), regulatory sanctions are brought forth outside of 
the formal criminal justice system by administrative agencies such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency or the Securities and Exchange Commission.  
Potential actions by such agencies can be grouped into two different types of strategies.  
The first is “regulatory policy” which includes inspections, resources available to the 
agency, as well as deregulation.  The second group includes “non-punitive actions” that 
such agencies take (e.g., warning letters, cease and desist orders).   
 
The variety of constructs in the legal domain serve to control corporate illegality 
through both prevention and deterrence.  Laws prevent crimes by telling potential 
offenders which behaviors are acceptable or prohibited—what is right and wrong.  
Regulatory actions such as inspections and warning letters can also educate 
corporations by identifying areas of non-compliance to the company.  Laws may also 
deter crime by increasing informal monitoring of behaviors—when people know that a 
behavior is illegal they may be more likely to report it to formal control agents such as 
police or regulators.  Official sanctions deter crimes generally (i.e., non-offenders will 
not offend because they do not want to be caught and punished) as well as specifically 
(i.e., offenders will not offend again because the pains of punishment were costly the 
first time).  In addition, regulatory actions and official sanctions increase the risk of 
reputational damage which, in the case of public companies, can serve as a powerful 
deterrent.    
 
Prior research on legal interventions has produced inconsistent results as to their 
effectiveness.  Deterrence theory posits that fear of detection, coupled with certain and 
severe sanctions for offending, will promote compliance.  However, in reality, offenders 
generally face a low risk of detection and punishments tend not to be severe (for 
example, fines are often smaller than the harm caused by the offense; Cohen, 1989).  
Additionally, government agencies employ many different strategies to promote 
compliance—some based in deterrence and others in cooperative strategies.  Certain 
approaches may be more effective than others or the effect of certain strategies may be 
context-specific (Axelrad, 2000; Gezelius & Hauck, 2011; May, 2005; May & Winter, 
1999; Welles & Enge, 2000).  To better understand whether the legal system matters as 
a whole, or whether certain strategies are more effective than others, the present review 
examines a variety of interventions.   
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2 Objectives of the Review 
Our overall objective is to identify and synthesize published and unpublished studies on 
formal legal and administrative prevention and control strategies—i.e., the actions and 
programs of government law enforcement agencies, legislative bodies, and regulatory 
agencies on corporate crime.  This review has considered all types of legal and 
regulatory practices as long as corporate crime prevention and control was part of the 
outcome.  Based on the evidence, we provide a systematic assessment of the 
effectiveness of the identified strategies and programs.  Generally, we assess the kind of 
research that is being done and its quality.   Specifically, we address the following 
questions:   
 
• Which kinds of legal and administrative interventions lower the risk of corporate 
offending?   
• Do effects vary by unit of analysis (e.g., individuals vs. firm)?   
• How do study characteristics influence observed outcomes? 
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3 Materials and Methods 
3.1  INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
3.1.1 Types of Studies 
To identify the universe of studies that examined the impact of legal and administrative 
deterrence strategies on the occurrence of corporate crime, we searched for articles 
using a broad set of search terms (see section 3.2.).  We then extracted studies from 
various sources that involved corporate crime behaviors and were empirical (broadly 
defined) in nature.   
 
Given our objective (which, as stated above, is to identify and synthesize published and 
unpublished studies on formal legal and administrative prevention and control 
strategies on corporate offending)  this review is limited to examining the impact of 
such interventions on  noncompliance  Nonetheless, we acknowledge a developing 
literature on the subject of firm over-compliance (extreme volunteerism). Most formal 
legal strategies are meant to prevent offending, not promote beyond-compliance 
behaviors.  We have included articles that look at beyond-compliance outcomes, but 
only calculated effect sizes representing the relationship between the independent 
variable and offending.     
 
Aside from limiting our outcome, we were highly inclusive in most other aspects of the 
review.  Given the dearth of rigorous empirical research on corporate crime, we 
included studies that encompass a wide variety of methodologies: experimental (e.g., 
lab studies or vignette surveys), quasi-experimental (e.g., pre/post-tests), and non-
experimental (e.g., correlational statistics using secondary data).  The studies included 
also contained a wide variety of data (e.g., data from official agencies, corporate reports, 
individuals’ survey responses, etc.).  Our search included published and unpublished 
articles, reports, documents, and other readily available sources.  The outcome of 
interest, corporate offending, could reflect actual behavior or behavioral intentions as 
reported by respondents. 
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3.1.2 Types of Units of Analysis 
There were no restrictions on the unit of analysis.  Included in our analyses are studies 
that use individual respondents, data on corporations, data on geographic areas (e.g., 
state emissions, cartels in various countries) and studies using other units of analysis 
(e.g., court cases or company-years). 
3.1.3 Types of Interventions 
This study focused on corporate crime deterrence stemming from any form of legal 
interventions.  We consider interventions to include any action that could ostensibly 
impact the decision-making of corporations.  Such legal actions include: laws (e.g., the 
passing of Sarbanes-Oxley), punitive sanctions (e.g., arrest, fines, or likelihood of 
prosecution), non-punitive actions by regulatory agencies (e.g., cease and desist order) 
and regulatory policies (e.g., number of times a company was inspected).   
 
There were many studies that examined more than one type of intervention—for 
example, the passing of a law and the number of regulatory inspections may have been 
included in a multiple regression model.  When these interventions were included as 
separate constructs, an effect size was calculated to represent each one’s relationship 
with offending.  When a study combined constructs (e.g., by using an index), we coded 
the intervention as “multiple treatments involved” and calculated such effect sizes 
separately from the other types of actions.    
3.1.4 Constructs Comprising Dependent Variables 
The outcome of each study is one of a variety of corporate illegal behaviors. Some 
examples of the outcomes  include: variations in pollution emissions, official records of 
compliance with regulations (e.g., environmental, employment, OSHA), recidivism, 
safety violations/compliance, number of financial transactions, perceived intentions to 
offend,  injuries from safety violations or environmental accidents, convictions, 
citations, noncompliant inspections, compliance measures (e.g., self-ratings), accuracy 
of regulatory records, complaints (e.g., about consumer fraud), and perceptions of 
enforcement effectiveness.  All measures included in the study fall under one of these 
descriptions.  
 
3.2  SEARCH STRATEGIES FOR IDENTIFICATION OF STUDIES 
3.2.1 Keyword Search on Online Abstract Databases and Internet Databases 
The first step in finding studies to be included was an exhaustive search of multiple 
online databases and other sources.  Within each source, we employed 69 search strings 
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(given below).  Published articles were found by applying each search string to the 
following databases: 
 
• Social Work Abstracts 
• ABI 
• PsycINFO 
• Sociological Abstracts 
• ERIC 
• CJA 
• Worldwide Political Science 
Abstracts 
• BSP 
• EconLit 
• PAIS International 
• WorldCat 
 
In addition to searching for published documents, we conducted a search of 
unpublished and additional published documents in the following sites: 
 
• Google Scholar 
• Digital Dissertation databases 
• Department of Justice website 
• Securities and Exchange 
Commission website 
• Federal Trade Commission website 
• Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration website 
• European Corporate Governance 
Institute website 
• DLA Piper website 
• International Chamber of 
Commerce website 
• National White Collar Crime Center 
website 
• Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network website 
• Ministry of Finance Netherlands 
website 
• United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime website 
• Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
website 
• European Commission—Company 
Law, Corporate Governance and 
Financial Crime Unit website 
• American Prosecutors Research 
Institute: White Collar Crime Unit 
website 
• Association of Inspectors General 
website 
• Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission website 
• U.S. Department of Justice Tax 
Division website 
• U.S. Department of Justice Criminal 
Division: Fraud Section website 
• U.S. Secret Service Financial Crimes 
Division website 
• Ethics Resource Center website 
• International Association of 
Financial Crimes Investigators 
website 
• Transparency International website 
• World Trade Organization website 
• British Home Office of Foreign and 
Commonwealth website 
• Department for Business Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform website 
• Crime Research Centre website 
• Australia Institute of Criminology 
website 
• The World Bank website 
16 
 
 
A complete list of the exact search strings used to collect studies from the above 
databases is given below: 
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• Sanction and Accounting Fraud 
• Sanction and Anti-competitive Behavior 
• Sanction and Antitrust 
• Sanction and Business Corruption 
• Sanction and Business Crime 
• Sanction and Business Misconduct 
• Sanction and Business Violations 
• Sanction and Corporate Corruption 
• Sanction and Corporate Manslaughter 
• Sanction and Corporate Crime 
• Sanction and Corporate Misconduct 
• Sanction and Corporate Violations 
• Sanction and Environmental Crime 
• Sanction and Health Care Fraud 
• Sanction and Organizational Corruption 
• Sanction and Organizational Crime 
• Sanction and Organizational Misconduct 
• Sanction and Organizational Violations 
• Sanction and Securities Fraud 
• Sanction and Ethical Business Culture 
• Sanction and Unethical Conduct 
• Sanction and Unethical Behavior 
• Sanction and White Collar Crime 
• Fine and Accounting Fraud 
• Fine and Anti-competitive Behavior 
• Fine and Antitrust 
• Fine and Business Corruption 
• Fine and Business Crime 
• Fine and Business Misconduct 
• Fine and Business Violations 
• Fine and Corporate Corruption 
• Fine and Corporate Manslaughter 
• Fine and Corporate Crime 
• Fine and Corporate Misconduct 
• Fine and Corporate Violations 
• Fine and Environmental Crime 
• Fine and Health Care Fraud 
• Fine and Organizational Corruption 
• Fine and Organizational Crime 
• Fine and Organizational Misconduct 
• Fine and Organizational Violations 
18 
 
• Fine and Securities Fraud 
• Fine and Ethical Business Culture 
• Fine and Unethical Conduct 
• Fine and Unethical Behavior 
• Fine and White Collar Crime 
• Regulatory Policy and Accounting Fraud 
• Regulatory Policy and Anti-competitive Behavior 
• Regulatory Policy and Antitrust 
• Regulatory Policy and Business Corruption 
• Regulatory Policy and Business Crime 
• Regulatory Policy and Business Misconduct 
• Regulatory Policy and Business Violations 
• Regulatory Policy and Corporate Corruption 
• Regulatory Policy and Corporate Manslaughter 
• Regulatory Policy and Corporate Crime 
• Regulatory Policy and Corporate Misconduct 
• Regulatory Policy and Corporate Violations 
• Regulatory Policy and Environmental Crime 
• Regulatory Policy and Health Care Fraud 
• Regulatory Policy and Organizational Corruption 
• Regulatory Policy and Organizational Crime 
• Regulatory Policy and Organizational Misconduct 
• Regulatory Policy and Organizational Violations 
• Regulatory Policy and Securities Fraud 
• Regulatory Policy and Ethical Business Culture 
• Regulatory Policy and Unethical Conduct 
• Regulatory Policy and Unethical Behavior 
• Regulatory Policy and White Collar Crime 
 
For each database and search string, we tracked the number of “hits” gleaned from the 
search (see Figure 1).  For each citation, we reviewed the abstract to determine 1) 
whether the article related to corporate crime deterrence and 2) if there was 
quantitative evidence of some kind that might be coded for a systematic review.  Studies 
meeting both of those criteria were considered “potentially eligible” and went through 
the next phase of eligibility coding, described below. 
3.2.2  Relevant Articles Coded for Inclusion 
After gathering the “potentially eligible” articles as described above, coders examined 
each document in its entirety and decided whether it would be included in the final 
dataset.   Inclusion depended on whether the study met five criteria: 
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1) The study was an evaluation of a corporate crime prevention/control strategy in 
the legal or administrative domains (i.e., deterrence resulting from effective 
regulations, fines, regulatory inspections, etc.). 
2) The study includes a comparison group (or a pre-intervention comparison 
period in the case of pre-post studies) that did not receive the treatment 
condition.  Studies may be experimental, quasi-experimental, or pre-post 
evaluations.  If the study does not include a treatment group, does it report 
standardized regression coefficients/Pearson correlations if the treatment is 
measured continuously?  
3) The study reports on at least one crime/misconduct outcome.  In accordance 
with our broad definition of corporate crime (see Section 1), the outcome of 
interest may be one of a wide range of criminal behaviors, regulatory violations, 
or civil violations. 
4) The study is written in English, but may be cross-national. 
5) The study was published before 2012.  (Plans to update the study after this 
current review are described in Section 5.) 
During this process, studies could be coded as “Eligible,” “Not Eligible,” or as a 
“Relevant Review.”  Articles meeting all five criteria were gathered for further coding 
(described in Section 3.3.).  A document deemed as a “relevant review” meant that 
although it did not meet all 5 criteria for inclusion, there were other studies cited within 
the piece that needed to be examined for potential inclusion. 
3.2.3  Web of Science Search 
All articles deemed “eligible” were entered into the Web of Science database for forward 
searching.  
3.2.4 Search of Leading Journals 
In addition to searching through bibliographies of studies that were found during our 
search, we also perused the contents of leading journals in the field.  Specifically, we 
examined the Table of Contents for all years of The Journal of Law and Economics and 
The Journal of Human Resources.  These journals were chosen because many of the 
studies already deemed eligible were published in those outlets. 
3.2.5  Requested Studies from Experts 
After coding all articles, we compiled a preliminary bibliography of included studies.  
We e-mailed this list to a group of experts in the corporate crime domain, some of 
whom provided us with additional studies that they thought met our criteria.  Note that 
this was only done after the initial study search described in Section 1 (for articles 
published before 2004) and was not completed for the second round of searching.   
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3.2.6 Conclusion of the Search 
Our search for all legal deterrence studies in the corporate crime domain was completed 
in the summer of 2012. All citations determined to be eligible were coded into a 
Microsoft Excel database for the purpose of calculating effect sizes (see Section 3.3.).  
During this coding process, we discovered that many studies did not include the 
necessary data to calculate effect sizes, so an effort was made to contact the lead author 
of each study and request the necessary information.  
 
Figure 1 provides the number of cases at each step in the process, to more fully illustrate 
how studies were funneled out of the current meta-analysis.  It also demonstrates how 
many cases were lost due to missing data.  It is important to reiterate that the present 
report actually combines the efforts of two separate searches.  The first search sought 
out articles on all corporate crime prevention efforts prior to 2004 (but eventually 
dropped any not relevant to legal deterrence) while the second search sought out studies 
specific to legal deterrence in the corporate crime domain.  Figure 1 therefore starts off 
with 2 different branches of the search that eventually merge as all cases were combined 
for analyses.  As is apparent from the number of “hits” from the relevant search terms, 
both before and after 2004, the winnowing process was extremely arduous and time 
consuming.  
 
3.3  DETAILS OF STUDY CODING CATEGORIES 
3.3.1  Coding Protocol  
For the initial study, we created a coding protocol that included the entire domain of 
corporate crime prevention/deterrence research.  As previously noted, this protocol 
included the specific treatment variables we are interested in here—legal restraints.  The 
entire coding protocol is attached as Appendix VI.  In this document, the variable 
named “TREATMENT” (p. 12-13 of the current document) provides all potential 
descriptions of the treatment program—including those not used in the current study.  
The interventions that are relevant to the current discussion are those categorized as: 
 
• 2) Law—any formal statute that prohibits or restricts corporate behavior, 
such as environmental laws, financial crime laws, antitrust laws, etc.  
• 3) Official Sanction/Fine—any formal punishment that a corporation or 
individual manager acting on behalf of the company can receive, 
including a guilty verdict, criminal prosecution, a jail sentence, or 
monetary fines,  
• 4) Regulatory Policy—normal regulatory procedures designed to increase 
the likelihood that corporate crime is discovered (e.g., the number of 
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inspections by agency personnel, agency budget, the number of 
regulatory personnel, or a lack of regulatory stringency), 
• 14) Other—any strategy that didn’t fall under one of these other 
categories 
• 15) Multiple Treatments—as previously mentioned, some studies created 
a construct that incorporated more than one approach where separate 
effect sizes could not be calculated for each intervention (e.g., combining 
the scores on questions about the perceived likelihood of prosecution as 
well as the perceived likelihood of regulatory inspection), 
• 16) Non-punitive Action by Regulatory Agency—administrative actions 
taken in reaction to knowledge of noncompliance  but does not entail a 
formal punishment (e.g., warning letters, cease-and-desist orders).  
The protocol includes codes used to describe the source of the study (Section I of 
Appendix VI; e.g., country of publication, journal’s disciplinary area), characteristics of 
the study (Section II; e.g., randomized experiment or not, start/end date of data 
collection, concerns about validity), sample characteristics (Section III; e.g., whether 
individuals or corporations), the methods and procedures used by the study authors 
(Section IV; e.g., use of a control group), descriptions of the independent variable 
(Section V; e.g., construct and operationalization), descriptions of the dependent 
variable (Section VI; e.g., construct and operationalization), effect size data (Section 
VII; i.e., coding the data provided that will be employed to calculate an effect size), and 
then conclusions made by the study authors (Section VIII).  There are also shaded boxes 
at the very end that describe the various types of effect sizes and relevant statistics 
needed for future analysis. 
3.3.2  Inter-rater Reliability 
Two members of the research team entered all data from the eligible articles into a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  There were two phases of data collection, described 
above—one collecting articles published before 2004 and another collecting and coding 
articles published from 2004 – 2011.  We conducted two separate inter-rater reliability 
tests since one of the initial coders was replaced in the second data collection.  For the 
pre-2004 articles, an initial coding session was completed in which 80 articles collected 
at that point were used for inter-rater reliability testing.  Coders went through 20 
articles at a time and resolved differences between the two databases.  Often, this 
collaboration would result in decision rules (provided as endnotes in the codebook).  
After reviewing approximately 80 articles in this manner, an acceptable inter-rater 
reliability was established for most variables (those not reaching either a Kappa value or 
Pearson correlation value of 0.70 were not be used in further analyses).  The same 
process took place for the post-2003 articles, although in this phase acceptable 
reliabilities were established after 20 articles.  The coders split the rest of the articles for 
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independent coding.  No changes were made to the coding sheet after an acceptable 
inter-rater reliability was established and no additional decision rules were necessary.     
 
3.4  STATISTICAL PROCEDURES 
3.4.1  Calculating Effect Sizes 
Our systematic review included a wide variety of studies and outcome measures. As 
such, we coded various forms of data and calculated multiple types of effect sizes. These 
included 1) the “standardized mean-difference effect size” for analyses comparing two 
groups’ performance on a continuous outcome, 2) the “product-moment correlation 
effect size” for relationships in which both the independent variable and dependent 
variable are continuous (or assumed to represent a continuous construct), and 3) the 
“Odds-Ratio Effect Size” when both the independent and dependent variables involved 
are dichotomous.6
 
  When reporting the results, we only compare similar effect sizes—for 
example, a standardized mean-difference effect size from Study A was NOT included in 
the same analysis as a product moment correlation effect size in Study B.  We calculated 
effect sizes both by hand in Microsoft Excel as well as using David B. Wilson’s Effect 
Size Calculator available on the Campbell Collaboration website.  Based on Lipsey and 
Wilson’s (2001) recommendations, the mean-difference effect sizes were transformed 
using Hedges’ small sample bias correction and all product-moment correlation effect 
sizes were converted to Fisher’s z for analyses. 
Note that it is inappropriate to create an average effect size when the unit of analysis 
differs among studies, when the constructs differ, or when some studies are cross-
sectional while others are longitudinal.  Therefore, we attempted to calculate separate 
effect sizes for 40 different groups.  However, we do not report results for categories 
where there are too few studies from which to draw reasonable conclusions.  For 
example, we are unable to report results for non-punitive sanctions (data are available 
on request); there are also many subgroups with too few cases.  The treatments and 
subgroups for which we do report are bolded in the following list7
 
: 
1) Treatment: Law 
a. Individual Samples/Cross-sectional 
b. Corporate Samples/Cross-sectional (122) 
c. Geographic Areas/Cross-sectional (123) 
d. Other units of analysis/Cross-sectional 
                                                        
6 There was not enough data to conduct a meta-analysis on Odds-Ratio effect sizes. 
7 The numbers in parentheses are a reference code identifying the subgroup’s location in the forest plots 
(see Appendix IV). 
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e. Individual Samples/Longitudinal 
f. Corporate Samples/Longitudinal 
g. Geographic Areas/Longitudinal (223) 
h. Other units of analysis/Longitudinal 
2) Treatment: Punitive Sanctions 
a. Individual Samples/Cross-sectional (131) 
b. Corporate Samples/Cross-sectional (132) 
c. Geographic Areas/Cross-sectional (133) 
d. Other units of analysis/Cross-sectional (134) 
e. Individual Samples/Longitudinal (231) 
f. Corporate Samples/Longitudinal (232) 
g. Geographic Areas/Longitudinal (233) 
h. Other units of analysis/Longitudinal 
3) Treatment: Non-punitive Sanctions 
a. Individual Samples/Cross-sectional 
b. Corporate Samples/Cross-sectional 
c. Geographic Areas/Cross-sectional 
d. Other units of analysis/Cross-sectional 
e. Individual Samples/Longitudinal 
f. Corporate Samples/Longitudinal 
g. Geographic Areas/Longitudinal 
h. Other units of analysis/Longitudinal 
4) Treatment: Regulatory Policies 
a. Individual Samples/Cross-sectional (141) 
b. Corporate Samples/Cross-sectional (142) 
c. Geographic Areas/Cross-sectional (143) 
d. Other units of analysis/Cross-sectional (144) 
e. Individual Samples/Longitudinal (241) 
f. Corporate Samples/Longitudinal (242) 
g. Geographic Areas/Longitudinal 
h. Other units of analysis/Longitudinal 
5) Treatment: Multiple treatments 
a. Individual Samples/Cross-sectional (1151) 
b. Corporate Samples/Cross-sectional (1152) 
c. Geographic Areas/Cross-sectional 
d. Other units of analysis/Cross-sectional 
e. Individual Samples/Longitudinal 
f. Corporate Samples/Longitudinal 
g. Geographic Areas/Longitudinal 
h. Other units of analysis/Longitudinal 
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Following Lipsey and Wilson (2001), we computed the mean effect sizes8
3.4.2 Assumption of Independence 
 and the 
homogeneity of effects across studies using the inverse variance weight method.  We 
assumed a random effects model and calculated variance components accordingly, 
using a method of moments estimator. Computations were run using Stata macros 
provided by D.B. Wilson (available on the Campbell Collaboration website).  
Many studies reported more than one outcome that is relevant to our domain of interest 
and a number of authors published more than one article using data from the same 
sample.  Proper analysis of the data requires that the effect sizes we calculate come from 
independent samples.  When there were multiple effect sizes describing the same 
relationship that came from the same sample, the effect sizes were averaged so that each 
sample only provided one (see Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).    
3.4.3 Moderator Analyses 
When calculating the average effect size for each construct of interest, we tested 
whether the studies within each category were homogenous—that is, whether the 
variability in effect sizes was due only to random sampling error or if there was 
something about the studies that caused the effect sizes to differ.  When variability in 
the statistic could not be dismissed as random sampling error, we conducted moderator 
analyses to determine whether certain study or sample characteristics could explain the 
variability in effects.  The measures included: 
 
• Whether the study was published/unpublished 
• The discipline of the journal where the study was published or (if not 
determinable) the discipline of the lead author 
• The year of publication 
• Whether the design was experimental/quasi-experimental as opposed to non-
experimental 
• Whether the study was conducted in the United States 
• Whether the independent variable was constructed using official data (e.g., court 
records, regulatory agency records, legislative records), self-report data, 
observations/site visits, or “other” 
• Whether the dependent variable was constructed using official data (e.g., 
regulatory agency records, court records), self-report data, observations/site 
visits, or “other” 
• Whether the sample was drawn from more than one organization 
• The mean age of the sample 
                                                        
8 We also examined the data for outliers and recoded them to be 2 standard deviations above/below the 
mean (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001).  
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• The predominant race of the sample 
• The predominant management level of the sample 
• The type of participants included in the sample (e.g., students, professionals) 
• The level of education of the sample 
• The industry from which the sample came 
• The average number of employees in the companies in the sample 
• The average profit of the companies in the sample 
• Whether the sample was randomly selected or not 
• Offense type 
 
Many of the studies were missing information on these methodological or sample 
characteristics, which limited our ability to conduct moderator analyses on the full 
sample.  We followed Williams (2013), who recommends using a fixed effects (or 
unpooled) model as opposed to a mixed effects model when cell sizes are small.  
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4 Results 
4.1  COMPUTATION OF EFFECT SIZES 
The studies included in the meta-analysis were heterogeneous, utilizing different units 
of analysis, types of treatments, and temporal ordering structures. In order to compute 
average effect sizes based on a meaningful, more homogenous group of studies, separate 
mean effect sizes were calculated for each combination of treatment type (law, punitive 
sanction, regulatory policy, non-punitive sanction, other sanction, and multiple 
treatments), unit of analysis (individual-level offending, company-level offending, 
geographic area offending rates, or other units of analysis), and time ordering (cross-
sectional, longitudinal, and both cross-sectional and longitudinal; see Section 3.4.1.). All 
of these categories were described above in the methods section and the frequency of 
effect sizes calculated for each category is presented in Appendix I.  
 
The computation of effect sizes from the studies was often indirect, reflecting a broader 
problem in the crime and justice research of poor descriptive validity (Farrington, 
2006). Descriptive validity is the “adequacy of reporting of key features of evaluations 
(e.g., design, sample sizes, characteristics of experimental units, descriptions of 
experimental and control conditions, outcome measures, effect sizes)” (Farrington, 
2006, p. 335). This information is necessary to carry out meta-analyses and systematic 
reviews. Standardized effect sizes were not provided in most of the articles reviewed, 
and the effect sizes for the present review were calculated indirectly from a variety of 
statistics. The frequencies of the statistics from which effect sizes were calculated is 
presented in Appendix I.  In addition, a table that shows the data available from each 
study as well as other study characteristics is presented in Appendix II. Also, due to the 
fact that a heterogeneous group of studies were examined with different measures of the 
treatments and offending outcomes, ES-Rs (correlations) were calculated from some 
studies and ES-Ds (standardized mean differences) were calculated for others, 
depending on whether the independent variable was continuous or dichotomous. 
Results for each of the two effect size types were calculated separately for each of the 
above categories (see Appendix II). Although this has the disadvantage of reducing the 
number of studies in each category, it is preferable to conduct separate analyses for the 
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two type of effect sizes to maintain statistical purity (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001, p. 57). The 
steps used to compute the effect sizes are described above in the methods section. The 
effect sizes for all of the studies are listed in Appendix III and forest plots are presented 
in Appendix IV. The results for each of the treatments are discussed individually below. 
 
4.2  META-ANALYSIS RESULTS 
4.2.1 Law 
Sufficient numbers of effect sizes were available to examine three types of studies: 
cross-sectional studies examining the effect of law on company-level offending (based 
on ES-Ds), cross-sectional studies examining the effect of law on geographic-level 
offending (based on ES-Rs and ES-Ds), and longitudinal studies examining the effect of 
law on geographic-level offending (based on ES-Rs). We were unable to evaluate the 
effect of law on individual offending. 
Company-level 
Five ES-Ds were calculated for cross-sectional studies at the company-level unit of 
analysis. These studies showed a marginal deterrent effect (ES=0.021; p=0.054; 95% 
confidence limits -0.00, 0.04). All five studies had a positive effect size (indicating a 
deterrent effect) and the 95% confidence intervals did not intersect zero for three of the 
five studies. 
Geographic-level 
Of the seven cross-sectional studies examining the effect of laws on geographic-level 
offending, three were ES-Rs and four were ES-Ds. For the former, the mean effect size 
showed a positive but non-significant deterrent effect (ES=0.301; p=0.244; 95% 
confidence limits -0.21, 0.81). Two of the three studies had effect sizes that were 
directionally positive with confidence intervals that did not cross zero (indicating 
statistical significance). The remaining study showed a counter-intuitive (iatrogenic) 
effect size.  However, the confidence interval crossed zero suggesting that this effect 
could be due to chance.  
 
For the ES-Ds, the mean effect size also showed a non-significant deterrent effect 
(ES=0.10; p=0.17; 95% confidence limits -0.04, 0.23). Although three of the four 
studies showed a positive effect size, the confidence interval crossed zero for three of the 
four studies. 
 
There were very few longitudinal studies examining the effect of laws. However, ES-Rs 
were able to be calculated for two studies examining the effect of laws on geographic-
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level ending. The mean effect size from these studies shows a non-significant iatrogenic 
effect on offending (ES= -0.018; p=0.883; 95% confidence limits -0.25, 0.22). 
Conclusion 
Overall, studies examining the impact of the law on corporate crime show a small and 
non-significant deterrent effect for cross sectional measures.  When examined using 
longitudinal studies, however, this relationship becomes counterintuitive (but remains 
non-significant).  Because the evidence is limited, it is imprudent to draw firm 
conclusions about the deterrent impact of law on corporate crime.  The tendency in the 
findings is to find a modest directional leaning toward deterrence in the cross sectional 
but not longitudinal studies.  These results may imply that the implementation of law 
has a short-term deterrent impact on offending that is not borne out over the long term 
or that changes in law might promote “defiance” for some firms under particular 
circumstances.  At this point, however, such interpretations are mere speculation.  
Additional research (using more rigorous methodology) is needed to tease out the actual 
impact of legislation on corporate crime.  
4.2.2 Punitive Sanctions 
Studies of the effect of punitive sanctions on corporate offending were more common 
than those that examined the impact of law. Consequently, we were able to calculate 
effect sizes for almost all of the different groups. Characteristics of all of these studies 
are listed in table X. 
Individual-level 
Seventeen (17) effect sizes were calculated from cross-sectional studies examining the 
effect of punitive sanctions on individual-level offending (11 ES-Rs and 6 ES-Ds). The 
mean effect size of the eleven ES-R studies showed a non-significant deterrent effect 
(ES=0.029; p=0.600; 95% confidence limits -0.08, 0.14). Of these 11 effect sizes, seven 
were positive (indicating a deterrent effect) and four of these did not intersect zero. The 
mean effect size of the six ES-D studies showed a non-significant effect as well 
(ES=0.03; p=0.59; 95% confidence limits -0.08, 0.15). Four of the six effect sizes were 
positive, three of the four intersected zero. 
For the longitudinal studies, two effect sizes could be used to calculate a mean effect size 
(from ES-Ds). The mean effect size was also positive but non-significant (ES=0.034; 
p=0.893; 95% confidence limits -0.46, 0.52). 
Company-level 
Ten ES-Rs and five ES-Ds were available from cross-sectional studies to calculate mean 
effect sizes. Both the mean effect size for the ES-Rs (0.083; p=0.110; 95% confidence 
limits -0.02, 0.18) and the ES-Ds (ES=0.204; p=0.758; 95% confidence limits -1.10, 
1.50) were non-significant. Two longitudinal ES-Rs could be used to calculate a mean 
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effect size, and the mean effect size was also non-significant (ES=-0.053; p=0.12; 95% 
confidence limits -0.12, 0.01). 
Geographic-level 
Analyses at the geographic level were less common among studies examining the effect 
of punitive sanctions compared to those examining the effect of laws. Three cross-
sectional ES-Rs were available from which to calculate a mean effect size. The effect was 
not significant (ES=0.008; p=0.923; 95% confidence limits -0.16, 0.18) nor was the 
average effect size for the two longitudinal ES-Rs (ES=-0.001; p=0.999; 95% confidence 
limits -0.20, 0.20). 
Other unit of analysis 
Four ES-Rs were available from cross-sectional studies using an “other” unit of analysis. 
The mean effect size showed a non-significant deterrent effect (ES=0.250; p=0.222; 
95% confidence limits -0.15, 0.65). However, since this is not a homogenous group of 
studies and the level of analysis may not be the same between the studies, these results 
should be interpreted cautiously. All four studies showed a positive effect, but only two 
of the studies had statistically significant results. 
Conclusion 
The evidence fails to show a consistent deterrent effect of punitive sanctions on 
individual offending, company-level offending, geographic-level offending, or offending 
among studies using an “other” unit of analysis.  Not only did the effect sizes fail to 
reach significance, they were small in magnitude.  This result holds regardless of 
whether the study is longitudinal or cross-sectional.  
4.2.3 Regulatory Policies 
There were a substantial number of studies that examined the effect of regulatory policy 
on corporate crime and, as was the case for punitive sanctions, we were able to calculate 
effect sizes across many of the different groups although studies are sparse in some 
cases (e.g., individual level offending, geographic-level offending and other units of 
analysis).   
Individual-level 
There were only two ES-Rs and no ES-Ds from cross-sectional studies examining the 
effect of regulatory sanctions at the individual level. The mean effect size of the two ES-
Rs showed a significant deterrent effect (ES= 0.095; p=0.039; 95% confidence limits 
0.00, 0.19). Additionally, there were two ES-Ds available to calculate a mean effect size 
from longitudinal studies. The mean effect size from these studies was marginally 
significant and positive (1.320; p=0.084; 95% confidence limits -0.18, 2.82). 
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Company-level 
There were numerous studies examining the effect of regulatory sanctions at the 
company level. The mean effect size from eight cross-sectional ES-Ds showed a 
significant deterrent effect (ES= 0.871; p=0.000; 95% confidence limits 0.44, 1.30) 
while the mean effect size from eighteen cross-sectional ES-Rs was not significant and 
negative (ES= -0.061; p=0.310; 95% confidence limits -0.18, 0.06). There were six effect 
sizes from longitudinal studies: four ES-Rs and two ES-Ds. These studies showed 
contradictory directional mean effects (i.e., one was negative and the other positive), 
but neither was significant (ES= -0.169; p=0.449; 95% confidence limits -0.61, 0.27) 
versus (ES= 0.48; p=0.276; 95% confidence limits -0.39, 1.35). 
Geographic-level 
A mean effect size could only be calculated for cross-sectional studies at the geographic 
level of analysis. The mean effect size for the six ES-Rs (ES= -0.086; p=0.198; 95% 
confidence limits -0.22, 0.05) and the two ES-Ds (ES= -0.05664; p=0.740; 95% 
confidence limits -0.39, 0.28) were not significant. 
Other Unit of Analysis 
Seven cross-sectional ES-R studies used another unit of analysis. However, the mean 
effect size for these studies was not significant (ES= 0.006; p=0.952; 95% confidence 
limits -0.18, 0.19). 
Conclusion 
Overall, the impact of regulatory sanctions on offending is inconsistent and seems 
dependent on how the treatment is measured.  The results suggest a deterrent effect of 
regulatory sanctions on individual offending; there is a significant deterrent effect based 
on cross-sectional studies (though there are only two) and a marginal deterrent effect 
based on longitudinal studies (though there are only two of these as well). At the 
company level, the mean effect size from studies using correlational measures show a 
non-significant iatrogenic effect while the studies examining differences between 
groups show a deterrent effect (significant in cross-sectional studies, non-significant in 
longitudinal studies).  It is possible that, at the company level, there is a tipping point 
whereby a certain amount of regulatory action encourages defiance instead of 
compliance.  Although this interpretation is purely conjecture and requires much more 
evidence to support it, qualitative research has uncovered instances of regulatory 
defiance along with occasions of “creative” compliance (McBarnet, 2004).  When 
examining regulatory sanctions by geographic area, more stringent regulations seem to 
promote offending although the effects are small and non-significant.  Taken as a whole, 
it is unclear what we can infer about the impact of regulatory sanctions on corporate 
behavior.  
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4.2.4 Multiple Types of Sanctions 
This category includes studies in which the treatment included multiple types of 
sanctions that fit into more than one of the above categories. 14 ES-Rs and two ES-Ds 
were available for this category. From these effect sizes, there was sufficient data to 
calculate mean effect sizes for cross-sectional studies at the individual and the company 
levels of analysis using ES-Rs. 
Individual-level 
The mean effect size from the five ES-R studies indicates a significant deterrent effect 
for this category of sanctions (ES= 0.096; p=0.045; 95% confidence limits 0.00, 0.19). 
Three of the five effect sizes were positive and none of the confidence intervals for these 
three effect sizes crossed zero. For the two non-positive effect sizes, confidence intervals 
for both crossed zero. 
Company-level 
Six ES-Rs were able to be calculated for company-level studies. The mean effect size 
from these studies also indicates a significant deterrent effect (ES= 0.114; p=0.029; 95% 
confidence limits 0.01, 0.22). Five of the six effect sizes are positive and the confidence 
intervals for all but one of these do not cross zero. 
Conclusion 
While mean effect sizes can only be calculated for cross-sectional studies which examine 
a treatment that include multiple types, the results show a significant deterrent effect of 
multiple types of sanctions on individual- and company-level offending.  It’s interesting 
that this category demonstrates a small, yet consistent deterrent effect on offending 
whereas the other interventions do not.  This may be due to the characteristics of the 
studies included in this category, but it would be interesting for future researchers to 
investigate whether a combination of programs works better than a particular method 
in isolation (see Simpson, et al, 2013). 
4.2.5  Summary of Results 
Out of the 25 effect sizes calculated, 16 (64%) indicated a desirable (i.e., deterrent) 
impact.  However, none of the effects were strong in magnitude and only 4 of those 
effect sizes were statistically significant.  It seems reasonable to argue that there just is 
not enough data available—most of our analyses are based on less than 10 studies.  
Furthermore, most of the studies included do not use rigorous methods that would rule 
out spurious relationships or establish proper temporal ordering.  The next section 
examines how study characteristics may impact the relationships found.  
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4.3  MODERATOR ANALYSES 
Moderator analyses were performed for ten methodological variables in categories 
where there was sufficient data and variation. These moderators included whether the 
study was published, the discipline of the study, publication year, whether the study was 
experimental/quasi-experimental as opposed to non-experimental, the country where 
the study was conducted, whether the study includes controls, the data source of the 
independent variable, the data source of the dependent variable, whether the sample 
was randomly selected, and the type of offense being studied. Unfortunately, few studies 
reported information on sample demographics or corporation characteristics, so 
moderator analyses on these substantive variables could not be performed. The full list 
of moderators explored is presented in the methods section. The results below discuss 
the nine methodological variables which are of theoretical interest and have sufficient 
data to explore. It was necessary to have at least two studies in each category of the 
moderator variable in order to calculate a meaningful mean effect size for that category. 
Due to the small number of effect sizes in each category (cell sizes of less than five), we 
followed the recommendation of Williams (2013), and used a fixed effects (or unpooled) 
model. 
4.3.1  Publication Bias 
Although we recognize that including unpublished studies often fails to fully ameliorate 
biases and may introduce additional concerns (Ferguson & Brannick, 2011), numerous 
steps were taken during the systematic review to locate unpublished studies as a way to 
lower the risk of the results being affected by publication bias.  Publication bias is a 
serious challenge to any review and it is important to understand the potential impact 
on one’s results. One way to investigate potential publication bias is to compare the 
mean effect sizes for published and unpublished studies. Sufficient data and variation 
was present to examine the moderating effect of publication status for nine categories of 
ES-R and ES-D studies. The categories are listed in the table in Appendix V. 108 
(67.9%) of the effect sizes came from published studies. In seven of the nine categories 
for which a moderator effect was examined, including studies examining the effect of 
punitive sanctions or regulatory policies, non-published studies showed a stronger 
deterrent effect than published studies which sometimes showed counter-intuitive 
effects. Non-published studies showed a significantly stronger deterrent effect in five of 
the seven categories. Studies examining the effect of law or multiple treatments, on the 
other hand, showed a stronger deterrent effect for published studies, though the 
moderator effect is only significant for studies examining multiple treatments.  Given 
that the differences between published and unpublished studies are inconsistent, 
publication bias is unlikely to have seriously impacted our findings. 
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4.3.2 Discipline of Study 
The studies used in the meta-analysis came from a wide range of disciplines. The 
following six categories of disciplines were examined where possible: studies published 
in human behavioral disciplines (including criminology, sociology, and psychology), 
financial disciplines (including business, marketing, accounting, or economics), political 
disciplines (including political science or public policy), environmental disciplines 
(environmental science or biology), other disciplines, and inter-disciplinary areas. 23 
(14.5%) of the effect sizes came from human behavioral disciplines, 29 (18.2%) came 
from financial disciplines, 23 (14.5%) came from political disciplines, 7 (4.4%) came 
from environmental disciplines, 44 (27.7%) came from inter-disciplinary areas, and 13 
(8.2%) came from other disciplines. 
 
Sufficient data was available to examine the moderating effect of discipline for nine 
categories of studies, including those examining the effect of laws, punitive sanctions, 
regulatory policies, and multiple treatments. There was evidence of significant 
moderating effects in three of the study types. Among the ES-Rs examining punitive 
sanctions, cross-sectional studies at the individual level of analysis showed a 
significantly stronger deterrent effect in human behavioral studies compared to 
financial studies (which showed a counter-intuitive effect). On the other hand, ES-D 
studies showed similar effect sizes for human behavioral and financial studies. Studies 
at the corporate level of analysis showed a significantly stronger deterrent effect in 
financial studies compared to inter-disciplinary studies. Overall, however, there does 
not appear to be a consistent set of findings by the disciplinary background of the study 
and therefore we conclude that academic discipline does not explain or help to 
understand differences across studies in observed outcomes.   
4.3.3 Year of Publication 
The year of publication may also affect the results as more recent studies may be more 
methodologically rigorous. The following categories of years were compared: 1996 and 
earlier, 1997-2001, 2002-2006, 2007 and after. Sufficient data was available to examine 
moderating effects for eight study types. In all but one study type examined, older 
studies showed a stronger deterrent effect. 
4.3.4 Study design 
The study design can also influence the results, as more methodologically rigorous 
experimental studies may be more likely to show a null result since they control for 
potentially spurious relationships and are better able to establish that the intervention 
preceded the outcome (Cullen and Jonson, add date). While only two categories of 
studies had sufficient data and variation to conduct a moderator analysis (cross-
sectional, individual-level studies of punitive sanctions or multiple sanctions), both of 
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these confirmed that non-experimental studies show a stronger deterrent effect than 
experimental studies. Although this result is consistent with our expectation that more 
rigorous methodological designs would be less apt to find deterrent effects, these results 
should be interpreted cautiously given the small number of studies available to conduct 
this analysis. 
4.3.5  Country 
Studies used in these analyses came from many different countries, but the large 
majority of effect sizes (78%) were calculated from studies conducted in the United 
Sates. There was sufficient data and variation to examine the moderating effect of 
country origin (US versus other) for four categories of studies. The analysis revealed 
that studies from outside the United States showed a stronger deterrent effect 
associated with punitive sanctions which may indicate more effective regulatory 
strategies outside of the United States but, given the paucity of studies from which to 
examine country moderator effects, this conclusion should be interpreted cautiously. 
 
It is also important to note that we did not include studies written in languages other 
than English, as we were limited by available resources.  This suggests that, despite the 
indication that control of corporate crime outside of the United States may be different, 
we are unable to assess a truly comparative perspective.  Although academics may 
publish in English-speaking journals, we are certain to have missed documents 
produced by the regulatory or law enforcement agencies in other countries.  Future 
research should attempt to locate these records to better understand how corporate 
crime is conceptualized as well as controlled in different countries. 
4.3.6 Controls 
Similar to our expectation that research design could moderate the relationship 
between treatment and outcome, we also expected that studies that included statistical 
control variables would also be less apt to find a deterrent effect. Two-thirds of the 
effect sizes (106) came from studies that used controls in their analyses. Though there 
were few categories in which there was sufficient data and variation to perform a 
moderator analysis, the evidence from studies of punitive sanctions was consistent with 
this expectation.  Studies that do not include controls show a stronger deterrent effect 
than those without controls.  This implies that deterrence may be confounded with 
other factors that come along with punitive sanctions (for example, it may be that 
reputational damage stemming from being prosecuted promotes deterrence, not the 
prosecution itself; Williams and Hawkins, 1986).  
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4.3.7  Data source of independent variable and dependent variables 
The treatment variable was most commonly measured using official data sources 
(60.4%), with 27.0% of the independent variables measured from self-reports. The 
remaining 12.6% came from other sources. Official data was more commonly used when 
the level of analysis was the corporation or geographic area and self-report data was 
more common when the unit of analysis was the individual. There was sufficient data to 
examine the moderating effect of the data source for five categories of studies, including 
cross-sectional studies of regulatory policies and official sanctions. For all but one 
category, self-report studies showed a stronger deterrent effect than studies using data 
from official sources or other data.  
 
A similar pattern was found for the three categories for which there was sufficient data 
to calculate the moderating effect of the data source of the dependent variable. Again, 
self-report data showed a stronger deterrent effect than official data sources, as studies 
using official data showed a small or counter-intuitive result.  
 
It is not unusual in the deterrence literature to find different outcomes by data type 
(self-report versus official data), especially considering that the different types of data 
generally are tied to different conceptualizations of deterrence.  In the case of official 
data, we presumably are measuring “objective” deterrence.  Self-report data capture 
deterrence as a perceptual process (Gerken & Grove, 1975).  Although self-report data 
are subject to erroneous perceptions and reporting, official data sources, because they 
depend on formal discovery of illegal acts, may be less able to discern deterrent effects.  
Our results suggest that deterrent processes are more apparent in the case of corporate 
crime when treatment (i.e., the application of sanctions) and reported offending is 
measured through self-reports compared with “objective” measures.     
 
4.3.8 Sample Selection 
Another methodological difference between the studies included in the meta-analysis 
was whether the sample was randomly selected. Randomly selected samples reflect 
greater methodological rigor (i.e., are less subject to selection biases), and these studies 
are expected to be more likely to show a null result. The moderating effect of sample 
selection was able to be examined for five types of cross-sectional studies: ES-R and ES-
D studies examining the effect of punitive sanctions on individual offending, ES-R 
studies examining the effect of punitive sanctions on company-level offending, and ES-
R and ES-D studies examining the effect of regulatory policies on company-level 
offending. The two categories where there were sufficient numbers of effect sizes to 
compare random and non-random sample (cross-sectional punitive sanctions on 
individual and corporate-level offending) demonstrate inconsistent differences.  For 
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corporate-level studies, non-random samples (and those studies that don’t report 
sample type) show a stronger deterrent effect than do random samples.  Yet, at the 
individual level, non-random samples show a counter-intuitive effect while random 
studies show a deterrent effect.  Based on this sparse information, the impact of having 
a random sample is unclear.   
4.3.9 Type of Offense 
It is also possible that different offenses are more or less impacted by legal 
interventions—for example, offenses that carry less chance of reputational damage to 
the company (e.g., bribery) may be influenced more by legal sanctions than offenses 
more subject to public outrage (e.g., environmental offending).  To assess the potential 
for differential effects, we coded the outcome variables into one of six categories: 1) 
financial offending (including antitrust and trade violations; 30.2% of effect sizes), 2) 
environmental crimes (47.8% of effect sizes), 3) Occupational Safety and Health Act 
violations (6.9% of effect sizes), 4) consumer safety violations (0.6% of effect sizes), 5) 
multiple outcomes combined (5.0% of effect sizes), and 6) other types of crime (9.4% of 
effect sizes).  There were sufficient numbers of effect sizes to compare outcomes for 5 
ES-r types and 2 ES-d types.   
 
For the impact of law, we were able compare the cross-sectional corporate-level ES-ds 
for financial offending and environmental offending, both of which demonstrate a 
significant deterrent effect.  Thus, laws appear to have a consistent effect on 
corporations for the two types of offenses we were able to compare.  Consistent with a 
crime prevention and control argument, this may be due to the educative effect of law 
(i.e., laws tell corporations how to behave and what will happen if laws are violated) or 
general deterrence—the threat of punishment and moral stigma associated with 
breaches of law.    
 
The effect of punitive sanctions was examined for individual-level cross-sectional ES-rs 
and ES-ds.  For the ES-rs, punitive sanctions are associated with a significant 
counterintuitive effect on financial offending, a significant deterrent effect on scales 
combining multiple outcomes, and a non-significant deterrent effect on other types of 
outcomes.  Looking at the ES-ds, punitive sanctions are associated with a non-
significant deterrent effect on financial crime and multiple outcomes.  While multiple 
types of crimes showed a significant deterrence effect and antitrust/financial offending 
showed a significant counterintuitive effect in the ES-R studies, the effect was not 
significant in the ES-D studies.  It may be that the mere presence of punitive sanctions 
is not enough to deter individual offenders generally, but increasing the number of 
sanctions pushes financial offenders to defy the law while encouraging compliance of 
corporate crime overall.  We were also able to compare the impact of punitive sanctions 
for corporate-level cross-sectional ES-rs, which showed that punitive sanctions 
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significantly deter financial and environmental crimes and have a non-significant 
deterrent effect on other types of crimes.  Our results hint at the possibility that punitive 
sanctions against the corporations responsible for financial crimes are more effective 
than those brought against individual offenders.     
 
The impact of regulatory policies on various outcomes could be examined using the ES-
rs at the cross-sectional corporate and cross-sectional geographic levels.  At the 
corporate level, regulatory policies exhibit a significant deterrent effect on financial 
crimes but appear to have a significant counterintuitive effect on environmental 
offending.  When looking at geographic areas, regulatory policies are associated with a 
counterintuitive effect on financial offending but a non-significant deterrent effect on 
environmental crimes.  It may be that a more general approach to improving 
environmental outcomes over a widespread area is more effective, whereas a more 
specific strategy for financial crimes is necessary.    
 
The effect of multiple treatments could be examined using ES-rs on cross-sectional 
corporate-level outcomes.  Here, multiple treatments have a significant deterrent effect 
on both financial offending and environmental offending.   This implies that applying 
multiple legal strategies has a consistent effect regardless of the type of crime being 
targeted.   
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5 Conclusions 
The available scientific evidence on the deterrent value of law, sanctions, and regulatory 
policies on corporate crime is widely scattered and methodologically varied.  Given that 
the subject matter is of great interest to scholars and policy-makers across many 
different disciplines, this is not surprising.  However, the broad scope of the literature 
has made this systematic review less parsimonious than we would have preferred and, 
although this review represents the first attempt to examine this literature in a 
systematic fashion, it is limited by the paucity of strong empirical studies on corporate 
deterrence.    
 
Taken as a whole, the basic findings of the review are inconclusive.  Out of the 40 
possible treatment categories, we were able to calculate a mean effect size for 19.  
Although most showed a positive albeit non-significant treatment effect, some 
(including a significant effect) were iatrogenic.  Looking at the specific mechanisms, the 
impact of LAW  on corporate crime showed a modest deterrent effect at the firm and 
geographical level of analysis (there was not enough data to calculate effect sizes for 
individuals).  However, this finding is limited to cross-sectional studies.  For 
PUNITIVE SANCTIONS , where there was substantially more data from which to 
calculate effect sizes, we observe a similar pattern: A tendency toward deterrence across 
units of analysis, with relatively few significant effects regardless of whether data are 
cross-sectional or longitudinal.  The one area where there appears to be a consistent 
treatment effect is in the area of REGULATORY POLICY, but only at the 
individual level.  Effects for other levels are contradictory (with some positive and 
others iatrogenic) and none are statistically significant.  
 
 It is not unusual to find deterrent effects at one level of analysis but not at another 
(Simpson, 2009).  As noted previously, this result may be an artifact of the type of data 
utilized at these different levels (perceptual self-report data versus official statistics—we 
did find a moderator effect for data type).  It may also be a function of how deterrence is 
conceptualized and measured—are the studies capturing a specific or general process?  
But, it might also reflect critical differences in how deterrence works for individuals 
versus organizations.  Boulding (1953), in his characterization of bureaucratic inertia, 
observed that a corporation is like an elephant, plodding along, oblivious to its 
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assortment of riders (see also, Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993).  The company might not 
respond quickly to changes in regulation or may be defiant toward existing regulation—
especially given the politicized nature of much regulatory policy. Individual managers, 
on the other hand, often have more personal relationships with regulators and thus are 
sensitive to the social opprobrium associated with violating that trust or as part of their 
corporate role, they may be responsible for particular components of regulatory 
compliance in which case failure to comply can result in an internal reprimand 
(including the possibility of dismissal).  A responsive regulatory strategy acknowledges 
and builds from these kinds of personal relationships (Nielsen & Parker, 2009).  But, 
responsive regulation also recognizes the need for different types of compliance and 
deterrence strategies because one size does not fit all and, as Braithwaite reminds us 
(2002:4), the same person or firm can at the same time have multiple motivations to 
comply or not.   Consistent with this point, in our systematic review MULTIPLE 
INTERVENTIONS  is the only treatment category to demonstrate a small but 
consistent treatment effect at both the individual and company level as well as for 
multiple offense types.  Although there are not enough studies to thoroughly test this 
approach as it applies to corporate deterrence, recognizing the need for different types 
and levels of interventions is consistent with the enforcement pyramid developed by 
Braithwaite and the pulling levers “varied menu” of sanctions (Kennedy, 1997) which 
have showed promise in the prevention and control of violence (Braga & Weisburd, 
2012). 
 
Although the systematic review did not reveal strong or dependable patterns across 
groups, we had enough information from various studies to explore potential moderator 
effects.  In particular, we examined whether our results could have been affected by 
publication bias, research quality, and the year in which the research was conducted.  
Similar to findings reported in other crime and justice research and systematic reviews 
(weaker designs are associated with stronger effects, Weisburd, Lum, & Petrosino, 
2001; Welsh, Peel, Farrington, Elffers, & Braga, 2011; Braga & Weisburd, 2012), the 
least methodologically rigorous designs— those that were not experimental versus 
experimental designs and those without statistical control variables versus controls 
were associated with a treatment effect.  We also found that older studies were 
associated with stronger deterrent effects—perhaps because the older studies are less 
methodologically rigorous that those that are newer.  Other moderator results were less 
clear (publication bias, country bias, disciplinary bias; offense type), but given how few 
of the analyses revealed strong treatment effects overall we think it is premature to draw 
any conclusions from these findings at this point. 
 
As already mentioned, this evaluation was less focused than we would have liked.  But, 
it was a critical first step toward establishing the intellectual and empirical terrain of 
corporate deterrence.  Now that this task has been accomplished, updates can be more 
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attentive to specific categories.  Because most of the relevant empirical literature is 
found in the punitive sanctions and regulatory policy categories, we recommend that 
future updates concentrate on these areas and that researchers design more rigorous 
studies to examine whether certain policies and interventions promote specific and/or 
general deterrence for companies and the managers working within them.  We also 
would call upon researchers to design future studies that test the promising multiple 
interventions (“pulling levers”) approach.  For too long, academics and policy-makers 
have speculated about the best means to prevent and control corporate crime absent 
well-designed and executed research.  Hopefully, this review will now form the basis of 
systematic research that will inform evidence-based practice. 
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6 Plans for Updating the Review 
The authors plan to update the review every 5 years.  
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9 Tables and Figures 
9.1  FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF STUDIES OR CASES AT EACH STAGE FIGURES OF THE 
SEARCH AND CODING PROCESS 
56 
 
 
57 
 
Appendix I: Frequencies of 
StatisticsUsed to Calculate Effect 
Sizes 
Data Type Count of 
Effect 
Sizes 
Percentage 
of Effect 
Sizes 
ES-D from Chi-Square statistics and sample size 2 1.26% 
ES-D from correlations 7 4.40% 
ES-D from group means and standard deviations 5 3.14% 
ES-D from proportions 7 4.40% 
ES-D from standardized regression 1 0.63% 
ES-D from t-test 4 2.52% 
ES-D from t-test and f-test 1 0.63% 
ES-D from unstandardized regression 21 13.21% 
ES-R from correlations 30 18.87% 
ES-R from correlations and unstandardized regression 1 0.63% 
ES-R from frequencies 1 0.63% 
ES-R from standardized regression 14 8.81% 
ES-R from standardized regression and correlations 5 3.14% 
ES-R from t-test 3 1.89% 
ES-R from t-test and correlations 1 0.63% 
ES-R from t-test and standardized regression 1 0.63% 
ES-R from unstandardized regression 46 28.93% 
ES-R from unstandardized regression and correlations 9 5.66% 
Total: 159 100.00% 
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Appendix II: Number of Effect Sizes 
for each Study Type 
Treatment: Law Number of Effect Sizes 
 ES-Rs ES-Ds Total 
Individual Samples/Cross-sectional 1 0 1 
Corporate Samples/Cross-sectional 1 5 6 
Geographic Areas/Cross-sectional 3 4 7 
Other units of analysis/Cross-sectional 1 1 2 
Individual Samples/Longitudinal 0 0 0 
Corporate Samples/Longitudinal 0 1 1 
Geographic Areas/Longitudinal 2 1 3 
Other units of analysis/Longitudinal 0 1 1 
Treatment: Punitive Sanctions    
Individual Samples/Cross-sectional 11 6 17 
Corporate Samples/Cross-sectional 10 5 15 
Geographic Areas/Cross-sectional 3 0 3 
Other units of analysis/Cross-sectional 4 1 5 
Individual Samples/Longitudinal 0 2 2 
Corporate Samples/Longitudinal 3 1 4 
Geographic Areas/Longitudinal 2 0 2 
Other units of analysis/Longitudinal 0 1 1 
Treatment: Regulatory Policies    
Individual Samples/Cross-sectional 2 1 3 
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Corporate Samples/Cross-sectional 19 8 27 
Geographic Areas/Cross-sectional 6 2 8 
Other units of analysis/Cross-sectional 7 0 7 
Individual Samples/Longitudinal 0 2 2 
Corporate Samples/Longitudinal 4 2 6 
Geographic Areas/Longitudinal 1 0 1 
Other units of analysis/Longitudinal 0 1 1 
Treatment: Non-punitive actions    
Individual Samples/Cross-sectional 0 0 0 
Corporate Samples/Cross-sectional 2 0 2 
Geographic Areas/Cross-sectional 0 0 0 
Other units of analysis/Cross-sectional 0 0 0 
Individual Samples/Longitudinal 0 0 0 
Corporate Samples/Longitudinal 0 0 0 
Geographic Areas/Longitudinal 0 0 0 
Other units of analysis/Longitudinal 0 0 0 
Treatment: Multiple treatments    
Individual Samples/Cross-sectional 5 0 5 
Corporate Samples/Cross-sectional 6 1 7 
Geographic Areas/Cross-sectional 1 0 1 
Other units of analysis/Cross-sectional 0 0 0 
Individual Samples/Longitudinal 0 0 0 
Corporate Samples/Longitudinal 1 1 2 
Geographic Areas/Longitudinal 1 0 1 
Other units of analysis/Longitudinal 0 0 0 
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Appendix III: Study Characteristics and Outcomes 
A: Treatment-Law 
Authors Year Time Ordering Treatment Unit of 
Analysis 
Data Type Effect 
Size 
Lower CI Upper CI 
Short and Toffel 2007 Cross-sectional Law Corporation ES-D from correlations 0.021 0.009 0.033 
Bolotova 2006 Cross-sectional Law Corporation ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
0.490 0.171 0.810 
Guerrero 2011 Cross-sectional Law Corporation ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
0.003 -0.014 0.020 
Mishra & Ray 2010 Cross-sectional Law Corporation ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
0.031 0.006 0.057 
Sam 2010 Cross-sectional Law Corporation ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
0.027 -0.025 0.080 
Jaffe 1974 Longitudinal Law Corporation ES-D from group means 
and standard deviations 
0.541 -4.816 5.898 
Greco 1987 Cross-sectional Law Geographic ES-D from t-test 1.404 0.512 2.297 
Ashenmiller & Normal 2011 Cross-sectional Law Geographic ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
0.000 -0.065 0.065 
Barker 2008 Cross-sectional Law Geographic ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
0.122 0.122 0.122 
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Payne & Gainey 2004 Cross-sectional Law Geographic ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
0.090 -0.520 0.700 
Alberini and Austin 1999 Longitudinal Law Geographic ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
0.008 -0.546 0.563 
Guerrero 2011 Cross-sectional Law Other ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
0.008 -0.029 0.045 
Connor 2003 Longitudinal Law Other ES-D from group means 
and standard deviations 
-0.274 -0.964 0.416 
Gao 2010/                 
2011 
Cross-sectional Law Individual ES-R from correlations and 
unstandardized regression 
-0.086 0.087 -0.259 
Mishra & Ray/        
Chatterjee & Ray 
2010/                   
2009 
Cross-sectional Law Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.250 0.266 0.233 
Broadman and 
Recanatini 
2002 Cross-sectional Law Geographic ES-R from correlations 0.761 1.169 0.352 
Wenner 1972 Cross-sectional Law Geographic ES-R from correlations -0.171 0.115 -0.457 
O'Toole et al.  1997 Cross-sectional Law Geographic ES-R from standardized 
regression and correlations 
0.360 0.646 0.074 
Grant 1997 Cross-sectional 
and Longitudinal 
Law Geographic ES-R from standardized 
regression 
-0.052 0.110 -0.214 
Rousso & Steves 2006 Longitudinal Law Geographic ES-R from correlations -0.092 0.317 -0.500 
Maxwell et al. 2000 Longitudinal Law Geographic ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.019 0.304 -0.267 
Burby and Patterson  1993 Cross-sectional Law Other ES-R from standardized 
regression 
0.094 0.290 -0.102 
 
B: Treatment- Punitive Sanction 
Weisburd, Waring, and 
Chayet 
1995 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-D from Chi-Square 
statistics and sample size 
-0.052 -0.310 0.207 
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Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le 
Coq, and Spagnolo/          
Bigoni 
2009/    
2011 
Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-D from group means 
and standard deviations 
0.432 0.102 0.762 
Simpson 2002 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-D from group means 
and standard deviations 
0.105 -0.188 0.398 
Wade 2004 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-D from t-test and f-test 0.059 -0.174 0.291 
Alm, Jackson, & McKee 2009 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
0.040 -0.017 0.098 
Bruner et al. 2008 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.137 -0.266 -0.008 
Weisburd, Waring, and 
Chayet 
2001 Longitudinal Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-D from Chi-Square 
statistics and sample size 
-0.190 -0.501 0.121 
Wade 2004 Longitudinal Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-D from t-test 0.315 -0.142 0.772 
Gibbs & Simpson 2009 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-D from correlations -0.275 -0.743 0.192 
Short and Toffel 2007 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-D from correlations -0.466 -0.508 -0.424 
EPA 1997 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-D from proportions 2.039 1.984 2.094 
Bolotova 2006 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.166 -0.437 0.104 
Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel 2009 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.126 -0.212 -0.039 
Earnhart 2004 Longitudinal Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.276 -2.065 1.513 
Burby and Patterson  1993 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Other ES-D from standardized 
regression 
0.021 -0.431 0.473 
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Connor 2003 Longitudinal Punitive 
Sanction 
Other ES-D from group means 
and standard deviations 
-2.457 -3.411 -1.503 
Shafer and Morris 2004 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-R from correlations 0.143 0.261 0.024 
Smith et al. 2007 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-R from correlations 0.236 0.365 0.107 
Ugrin 2008 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-R from correlations 0.230 0.409 0.051 
Piquero, Tibbetts, & 
Blankenship 
2005 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-R from standardized 
regression and correlations 
0.142 0.314 -0.030 
Wenzel 2004 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-R from standardized 
regression and correlations 
0.095 0.148 0.043 
Akir & Malie 2010 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.241 -0.073 -0.409 
Alm, Jackson, & McKee 2009 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.006 0.022 -0.035 
Bruner et al. 2008 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.311 -0.262 -0.360 
Piquero & Piquero 2006 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.016 0.230 -0.198 
Pryor et al. 2008 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.068 0.156 -0.019 
Gao 2010/                 
2011 
Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Individual ES-R from unstandardized 
regression and correlations 
-0.016 0.157 -0.188 
Bolotova 2006 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from correlation -0.045 0.083 -0.173 
Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel 2009 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from correlations -0.134 -0.098 -0.169 
Fowler-Rians 1997 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from correlations 0.052 0.230 -0.125 
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Gibbs & Simpson 2009 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from correlations -0.023 0.028 -0.074 
Hallward-Driemeier 2009 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from correlations 0.385 0.409 0.361 
Almutairi 2000 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from standardized 
regression 
0.477 0.645 0.309 
Langbert 1996 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from t-test -0.050 0.080 -0.180 
Braithwaite and Makkai 1991 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.058 0.155 -0.039 
Earnhart 2004/    
2009 
Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.003 0.009 -0.016 
Shimshack and Ward 2005 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.150 0.161 0.139 
Gray and Scholz 1993 Cross-sectional 
and Longitudinal 
Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from correlations -0.182 -0.159 -0.206 
Jesilow, Geis, and 
O'Brien 
1985 Longitudinal Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from frequencies -0.087 0.024 -0.199 
Makkai and Braithwaite 1994 Longitudinal Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from standardized 
regression 
-0.049 0.048 -0.146 
Stretesky and Lynch 2009 Longitudinal Punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.000 0.148 -0.148 
Broadman and 
Recanatini 
2002 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Geographic ES-R from correlations 0.361 0.770 -0.048 
May and Winter 1999 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Geographic ES-R from standardized 
regression 
-0.096 0.039 -0.230 
Rickman & Witt 2007 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Geographic ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.007 0.153 -0.138 
Alberini and Austin 1999 Longitudinal Punitive 
Sanction 
Geographic ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.005 0.288 -0.278 
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Maxwell et al. 2000 Longitudinal Punitive 
Sanction 
Geographic ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.005 0.281 -0.291 
Burby and Patterson  1993 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Other ES-R from standardized 
regression 
0.085 0.281 -0.111 
Sam 2010 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Other ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.001 0.024 -0.021 
Short and Toffell 2008 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Other ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.876 0.907 0.844 
Vidovic and Khanna 2012 Cross-sectional Punitive 
Sanction 
Other ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.031 0.049 0.012 
Foulon et al. 2002 Cross-sectional 
and Longitudinal 
Punitive 
Sanction 
Other ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.012 0.578 -0.553 
Lanoie 1992 Cross-sectional 
and Longitudinal 
Punitive 
Sanction 
Other ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.002 0.165 -0.170 
Meadow 1993 Cross-sectional 
and Longitudinal 
Punitive 
Sanction 
Other ES-R from unstandardized 
regression and correlations 
-0.122 -0.016 -0.227 
 
C: Treatment- Non-punitive Sanction 
Gibbs & Simpson 2009 Cross-sectional Non-punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from correlations -0.097 -0.046 -0.148 
Shimshack and Ward 2005 Cross-sectional Non-punitive 
Sanction 
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.256 -0.246 -0.267 
 
 
D: Treatment- Regulatory Policy 
Alm, Jackson, & McKee 2009 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Individual ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.022 -0.092 0.047 
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Boardman et al.  1998 Longitudinal Regulatory 
Policy  
Individual ES-D from t-test 2.093 1.577 2.609 
Wade 2004 Longitudinal Regulatory 
Policy  
Individual ES-D from t-test 0.566 0.163 0.968 
Nielsen and Parker 2005 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-D from correlations 0.071 -3.023 3.165 
Short and Toffel 2007 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-D from correlations -0.461 -0.545 -0.378 
US GAO 1988 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-D from proportions 0.764 0.757 0.772 
Gerardu and Wasserman 1994 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-D from proportions 0.962 2.059 2.462 
Gerardu and Wasserman 1991 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-D from proportions 3.763 3.617 3.909 
Krahn 1998 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-D from proportions 1.284 0.991 1.577 
Bennear 2007 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.013 -0.021 -0.005 
Telle 2009 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.053 -0.180 0.075 
Chang 1993 Cross-sectional 
and Longitudinal 
Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.274 -0.964 0.416 
Li 2009 Longitudinal Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-D from correlations 0.016 -0.377 0.409 
EPA 1992 Longitudinal Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-D from proportions 0.901 0.854 0.949 
O'Toole et al.  1997 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Geographic ES-D from correlations 0.251 -0.329 0.831 
Klein 2010 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Geographic ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.151 -0.232 -0.070 
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Yang 2007 Longitudinal Regulatory 
Policy  
Other ES-D from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.009 -0.110 0.092 
Shafer & Morris 2004 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Individual ES-R from correlations 0.162 0.280 0.043 
Alm, Jackson, & McKee 2009 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Individual ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.063 0.092 0.035 
Gibbs & Simpson 2009 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from correlations 0.000 0.051 -0.051 
Hallward-Driemeier 2009 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from correlations -0.130 -0.106 -0.154 
Short and Toffel 2007 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from correlations -0.225 -0.219 -0.231 
Pargal et al.  1997 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from standardized 
regression 
0.000 0.125 -0.125 
Shimshack and Ward 2005 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from standardized 
regression 
-0.620 -0.610 -0.631 
Langbert 1996 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from t-test 0.123 0.253 -0.007 
Moran 1985 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from t-test 0.048 0.080 0.017 
Kassinis and Vafeas 2002 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from t-test and 
correlations 
0.053 0.149 -0.043 
Berg et al. 2012 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.660 0.696 0.623 
Earnhart 2004 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.068 -0.055 -0.080 
Earnhart 2007 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.075 -0.043 -0.106 
Earnhart 2009 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.003 0.016 -0.010 
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Evans et al. 2011 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.037 -0.003 -0.071 
Gray & Shadbegian 2004 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.129 0.187 0.072 
Gray & Shadbeguan 2007 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.279 -0.192 -0.365 
Hwang 2008 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.031 0.085 -0.148 
Pothukuchi  2008 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.663 -0.540 -0.787 
Wu 2009 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.109 0.016 -0.234 
Mobus 2005 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression and correlations 
0.055 0.228 -0.118 
Braithwaite, Braithwaite, 
Gibson, and Makkai 
1994 Cross-sectional 
and Longitudinal 
Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from correlations 0.191 0.288 0.093 
Gray and Scholz 1993 Cross-sectional 
and Longitudinal 
Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from correlations -0.151 -0.128 -0.175 
Helland and Whitford 2003 Cross-sectional 
and Longitudinal 
Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.043 0.023 -0.109 
Makkai and Braithwaite 1994 Longitudinal Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from standardized 
regression 
0.040 0.148 -0.068 
Earnhart 2004 Longitudinal Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.027 0.349 -0.295 
Stretesky and Lynch 2009 Longitudinal Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.000 0.148 -0.148 
Simpson & Schell 2009 Longitudinal Regulatory 
Policy  
Corporation ES-R from unstandardized 
regression and correlations 
-0.717 -0.610 -0.825 
Jing & Graham 2008 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Geographic ES-R from correlations -0.637 -0.345 -0.930 
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Wenner 1972 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Geographic ES-R from correlations -0.232 0.053 -0.518 
May and Winter 1999 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Geographic ES-R from standardized 
regression 
0.097 0.232 -0.037 
O'Toole et al.  1997 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Geographic ES-R from standardized 
regression and correlations 
0.122 0.408 -0.164 
Barker 2008 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Geographic ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.001 0.110 -0.108 
Klein 2010 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Geographic ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.089 -0.051 -0.127 
Maxwell et al. 2000 Longitudinal Regulatory 
Policy  
Geographic ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.026 0.311 -0.260 
Burby and Patterson  1993 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Other ES-R from standardized 
regression 
0.073 0.269 -0.123 
Burby et al. 1998 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Other ES-R from standardized 
regression 
0.084 0.152 0.015 
Guerrero 2011 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Other ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.008 0.026 -0.009 
Telle 2009 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Other ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
-0.060 0.004 -0.124 
Toffel and Short 2011 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Other ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.277 0.301 0.254 
Vidovic and Khanna 2012 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Other ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.018 0.036 -0.001 
Short and Toffell 2008 Cross-sectional Regulatory 
Policy  
Other ES-R from unstandardized 
regression and correlations 
-0.351 -0.334 -0.368 
Klahsen 1999 Cross-sectional 
and Longitudinal 
Regulatory 
Policy  
Other ES-R from correlations 0.034 0.135 -0.066 
Grau and Groves 1997 Cross-sectional 
and Longitudinal 
Regulatory 
Policy  
Other ES-R from t-test and 
standardized regression 
0.217 0.379 0.056 
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Lanoie 1992 Cross-sectional 
and Longitudinal 
Regulatory 
Policy  
Other ES-R from unstandardized 
regression 
0.114 0.281 -0.054 
Meadow 1993 Cross-sectional 
and Longitudinal 
Regulatory 
Policy  
Other ES-R from unstandardized 
regression and correlations 
-0.146 -0.041 -0.251 
 
E: Treatment- Multiple Sanction Types 
Chatterji, Levine, & 
Toffel 
2009 Cross-sectional Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Corporation ES-D from 
unstandardized 
regression 
-0.128 -0.217 -0.040 
EPA 1992 Longitudinal Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Corporation ES-D from proportions 0.341 0.122 0.559 
Ulrich et al. 2003 Cross-sectional Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Individual ES-R from correlations 0.229 0.353 0.105 
Simpson and Piquero 2002 Cross-sectional Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Individual ES-R from standardized 
regression 
0.000 0.100 -0.100 
Piquero et al 2005 Cross-sectional Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Individual ES-R from 
unstandardized 
regression 
-0.038 0.135 -0.211 
Piquero 2012 Cross-sectional Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Individual ES-R from 
unstandardized 
regression 
0.217 0.431 0.003 
Gurley et al 2007 Cross-sectional Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Individual ES-R from 
unstandardized 
regression and 
correlations 
0.102 0.177 0.027 
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Gibbs & Simpson 2009 Cross-sectional Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Corporation ES-R from correlations -0.063 -0.012 -0.114 
Hartman et al. 1997 Cross-sectional Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Corporation ES-R from correlations 0.485 0.893 0.076 
Pellicioni 2002 Cross-sectional Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Corporation ES-R from correlations 0.139 0.225 0.053 
Almutairi 2000 Cross-sectional Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Corporation ES-R from standardized 
regression 
0.250 0.418 0.082 
Earnhart 2007 Cross-sectional Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Corporation ES-R from 
unstandardized 
regression 
0.159 0.191 0.127 
Gray & Shadbegian 2004 Cross-sectional Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Corporation ES-R from 
unstandardized 
regression and 
correlations 
0.043 0.099 -0.013 
Earnhart 2004 Longitudinal Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Corporation ES-R from 
unstandardized 
regression 
0.172 0.494 -0.150 
Anderson & Gray 2006 Cross-sectional Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Geographic ES-R from correlations 0.149 0.715 -0.417 
Rousso & Steves 2006 Longitudinal Multiple 
Sanction 
Types 
Geographic ES-R from correlations 0.097 0.506 -0.312 
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Appendix IV: Forest Plots 
ES-D FOREST PLOTS 
Law 
Corporate Cross-Sectional (122) 
 
Geographic Cross-Sectional (123) 
 
Punitive Sanctions 
Individual Cross-Sectional (131) 
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Corporate Cross-Sectional (132) 
 
Individual Longitudinal (231) 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory Policies 
Corporate Cross-Sectional (142) 
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Geographic Cross-Sectional (143) 
 
Individual Longitudinal (241) 
 
Corporate Longitudinal (242) 
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ES-R FOREST PLOTS  
Law 
Geographic Cross-Sectional (123) 
 
Geographic Longitudinal (223) 
 
Punitive Sanctions 
Individual Cross-Sectional (131) 
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Corporate Cross-Sectional (132) 
 
Geographic Cross-Sectional (133) 
 
Other Cross-Sectional (134) 
 
Corporate Longitudinal (232) 
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Geographic Longitudinal (233) 
 
Regulatory Policies 
Individual Cross-Sectional (141) 
 
Corporate Cross-Sectional (142) 
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Geographic Cross-Sectional (143) 
 
Other Cross-Sectional (144) 
 
 
Corporate Longitudinal (242) 
 
Multiple Treatments 
Individual Cross-Sectional (1151) 
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Corporate Cross-Sectional (1152) 
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Appendix V: Categories examined as 
Moderators for Deterrence 
Outcomes 
Treatment: Law 
Publication 
Bias: 
Published vs. 
Unpublished 
Discipline Year of 
Publication 
Study 
Design: 
Experimental 
vs. Non-
Experimental 
Country: 
USA vs. 
Non-USA 
ES-R ES-D ES-R ES-D ES-R ES-D ES-R ES-
D 
ES-R ES-D 
Individual 
Samples/Cross-
sectional 
          
Corporate 
Samples/Cross-
sectional 
 0.022 
0.013 
 Financial 
0.012 
Multi 
0.022 
     0.016 
0.034 
Geographic 
Areas/Cross-
sectional 
          
Other units of 
analysis/Cross-
sectional 
          
Individual 
Samples/Longitudinal 
          
Corporate 
Samples/Longitudinal 
          
Geographic 
Areas/Longitudinal 
          
Other units of 
analysis/Longitudinal 
          
Treatment: Punitive Sanctions 
Individual -0.0499  0.011 Human Human 2002- 02-06 -0.059  -0.060  
81 
 
Samples/Cross-
sectional 
0.078* 0.061 bx 0.113 
Financial 
-0.073* 
bx 0.017 
Financial 
0.011 
2006: 
0.0102 
2007+ 
-
0.060* 
0.077 
07+ 
0.011 
0.064* 0.059* 
Corporate 
Samples/Cross-
sectional 
0.071 
0.367* 
-0.400 
1.952* 
Financial 
0.365 
Multi 
0.073* 
 -96 
0.019 
97-01 
0.276 
02-06 
0.084 
07+ 
0.184* 
   0.071 
0.355* 
 
Geographic 
Areas/Cross-
sectional 
          
Other units of 
analysis/Cross-
sectional 
          
Individual 
Samples/Longitudinal 
          
Corporate 
Samples/Longitudinal 
          
Geographic 
Areas/Longitudinal 
          
Other units of 
analysis/Longitudinal 
          
Treatment: Regulatory Policies 
Individual 
Samples/Cross-
sectional 
          
Corporate 
Samples/Cross-
sectional 
-0.238 
0.073* 
-0.018 
0.772 
Other 
0.049 
Financial 
0.018 
Political 
-0.059 
Enviro -
0.390 
Multi -
0.316* 
Enviro 
2.584 
Political 
0.417 
Multi -
0.339 
-96 
0.053 
02-06 
-0.321 
07+ -
0.176* 
-96 
2.796 
97-01 
0.765 
07+ -
0.018* 
   0.418 
0.364 
Geographic 
Areas/Cross-
sectional 
-0.003 
0.092* 
 Political 
0.051 
Financial 
-0.077 
 97-01 
0.102 
07+ -
0.088* 
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Other units of 
analysis/Cross-
sectional 
  Political 
0.083 
Multi 
0.108 
       
Individual 
Samples/Longitudinal 
          
Corporate 
Samples/Longitudinal 
          
Geographic 
Areas/Longitudinal 
          
Other units of 
analysis/Longitudinal 
          
Treatment: Non-punitive actions 
Individual 
Samples/Cross-
sectional 
          
Corporate 
Samples/Cross-
sectional 
          
Geographic 
Areas/Cross-
sectional 
          
Other units of 
analysis/Cross-
sectional 
          
Individual 
Samples/Longitudinal 
          
Corporate 
Samples/Longitudinal 
          
Geographic 
Areas/Longitudinal 
          
Other units of 
analysis/Longitudinal 
          
Treatment: Multiple treatments 
Individual 
Samples/Cross-
sectional 
  Human 
bx 0.063 
Other 
0.066 
 02-06 
0.069 
07+ 
0.114 
 0.023 
0.136* 
   
Corporate 
Samples/Cross-
sectional 
.09719 
.08922* 
   97-01 
0.284 
02-06 
0.072 
07+ 
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0.097* 
Geographic 
Areas/Cross-
sectional 
          
Other units of 
analysis/Cross-
sectional 
          
Individual 
Samples/Longitudinal 
          
Corporate 
Samples/Longitudinal 
          
Geographic 
Areas/Longitudinal 
          
Other units of 
analysis/Longitudinal 
          
*=Qbetween significant at .05 
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Appendix V: Moderators Continued 
 Controls vs. No 
Controls 
Data Source for IV Data Source for DV Sample Selection 
(R=Random, 
NR=Non-Random, 
M=Missing) 
Type of Crime 
 ES-R ES-D ES-R ES-
D 
ES-R ES-
D 
ES-R ES-D ES-R ES-D 
Treatment: Law           
Individual Samples/Cross-
sectional 
          
Corporate Samples/Cross-
sectional 
         Financial: 
0.03 
Env.: 0.02 
Geographic Areas/Cross-
sectional 
          
Other units of analysis/Cross-
sectional 
          
Individual Samples/Longitudinal           
Corporate Samples/Longitudinal           
Geographic Areas/Longitudinal           
Other units of           
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analysis/Longitudinal 
Treatment: Punitive Sanctions 
Individual Samples/Cross-
sectional 
-0.043 
0.194* 
 SR 0.372 
Other 0.285* 
   R 0.075 
NR  
-0.173* 
 Financial:-
0.04 
Multiple: 0.24 
Other: 0.03* 
Financial:0.01 
Multiple: 0.02 
Corporate Samples/Cross-
sectional 
0.074 
0.288* 
 SR 0.363 
Official 0.070* 
 SR 0.300 
Official 0.073* 
 R 0.024 
NR 
0.072* 
M 0.370 
NR 0.065 
M 0.040 
Financial: 
0.37 
Env.: 0.07 
Other: 0.02* 
 
Geographic Areas/Cross-
sectional 
          
Other units of analysis/Cross-
sectional 
          
Individual Samples/Longitudinal           
Corporate Samples/Longitudinal           
Geographic Areas/Longitudinal           
Other units of 
analysis/Longitudinal 
          
Treatment: Regulatory Policies 
Individual Samples/Cross-
sectional 
          
Corporate Samples/Cross-
sectional 
-0.210 
-0.215 
 SR 0.096 
Official -0.228* 
 SR 0.087 
Official -0.230* 
 NR   
-0.216  
M   
-0.126* 
NR -0.017 
M 2.796* 
Financial:0.11 
Env.: -0.23* 
 
Geographic Areas/Cross-
sectional 
  SR -0.082 
Other 0.250 
 SR 0.102 
Official -0.090* 
   Financial:-
0.09 
Env. 0.05* 
 
Other units of analysis/Cross-   SR 0.083        
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sectional Official -0.051* 
Individual Samples/Longitudinal           
Corporate Samples/Longitudinal           
Geographic Areas/Longitudinal           
Other units of 
analysis/Longitudinal 
          
Treatment: Non-punitive actions 
Individual Samples/Cross-
sectional 
          
Corporate Samples/Cross-
sectional 
          
Geographic Areas/Cross-
sectional 
          
Other units of analysis/Cross-
sectional 
          
Individual Samples/Longitudinal           
Corporate Samples/Longitudinal           
Geographic Areas/Longitudinal           
Other units of 
analysis/Longitudinal 
          
Treatment: Multiple treatments 
Individual Samples/Cross-
sectional 
          
Corporate Samples/Cross-
sectional 
        Financial:0.16 
Env.:0.09 
 
Geographic Areas/Cross-
sectional 
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Other units of analysis/Cross-
sectional 
          
Individual Samples/Longitudinal           
Corporate Samples/Longitudinal           
Geographic Areas/Longitudinal           
Other units of 
analysis/Longitudinal 
          
*=Qbetween significant at .05 
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Appendix VI: Coding Protocol 
 
CC Meta-Analysis Coding Sheets: Study-Level Coding Protocol 
 
Bibliographic Reference (APA 
format):______________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
_____________________ 
 
I. Source Descriptors 
Variable Name Code Item 
ID  
1) Study ID number:  
- First 3 letters of first author’s last name 
followed by year 
- If duplicates, add an “A” or “B” based on 
alphabetical order of titles 
PUBTYPE  
2) Type of Publication: 
1. Book 2. Book chapter 
3. Journal article 4. Thesis or 
dissertation 
5. Government report 
(state/local) 
6. Government report 
(federal) 
7. Working paper 8. Conference paper 
9. Regulatory Agency 
report 
10. Corporate Report 
11. Other (specify)  
 
PUBTYPE_OTH  
2b) Type of Publication—specify other publication type:  
 
YEAR  3) Year of Publication 
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DISCIPLINE  
4) Disciplinary Affiliation of Publication/Journali
1. Criminology 
: 
2. Sociology 
3. Business/Marketing 
4. Political Science 
5. Environmental Science/Biology 
6. Psychology 
7. Public Policy 
8. Economics 
9. Other 
10. Multiple disciplines (list under DISC_OTH) 
DISC_OTH  
4b) Disciplinary Affiliation of Publication/Journal—
specify other discipline:  
 
FUNDING  
5) Source of funding for the research: 
0. No funding/None reported  
1. Government agency 
2. University 
3. NGO/Non-profit 
4. Private business 
5. Other (specify) 
FUND_OTH  
5b) Source of funding for the research—specify other: 
 
 
NAT_PUB  6) Country of Publication 
DATE  7) Date coded 
CODER ID  
8) Coder: 
1. Natalie 
2. Patricia 
3. Melissa 
4. Mariel 
II. Study Characteristics 
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STUDYTYPE  
1) Type of study: 
1. Randomized experiment (in-basket or lab; e.g., 
conditions are randomized at the individual level or everyone 
receives the same survey) 
2. Randomized experiment (vignette survey; e.g., 
conditions within scenarios are randomized) 
 3. Nonequivalent control group (quasi-
experimental)—has a   comparison group that is not randomly assigned 
(e.g.,  matched pairs comparison or propensity score matching) 
 4. Time-series/pre-posttest (no control group) 
 5. Time-series/pre-posttest (with control group) 
6. Non-experimental (i.e., multiple regression or 
correlation) 
 7. Other (specify) 
STTYPE_OTH  
1b) Type of study—specify Other:  
 
STARTDATE  2) Date Range of Research: First year of data 
ENDDATE  3) Date Range of Research: Last year of data 
NAT_STUD  
4) Country where study conducted: 
 
NUMOUT  
5) Number of crime/misconduct outcomes reported in 
studyii
UOA 
 
 
6) What is the unit of analysis in this study (i.e., the type 
of outcome)? 
1. Individual decision-making/behavior 
2. Company decision-making/behavior 
3. Geographic area (e.g., state, country) 
4. Other (specify) 
UOA_OTH  
6b) What is the unit of analysis in this study?  Specify 
other:  
 
DATARLBTY  
7) Did the researcher empirically assess the reliability of 
the data collected? 
 1. Yes 
 0. No 
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DATAVLDY  
8) Did the researcher assess the validity of the data 
collected (e.g., discussed whether measures used 
accurately represented the construct of interest)? 
 1. Yes 
 0. No 
 
DATAPROB  
9) If the researcher noted any concerns about the data, 
please describe here: 
 
 
 
III. Sample Descriptors 
SAMPLEN  1) Sample size 
SAMP_INDCOR  
2) Does the sample consist of individuals or 
corporations? 
 1. Individuals 
 2. Corporations 
 3. Other (specify; e.g., court cases) 
SAMP_OTHER  
2b) Does the sample consist of individuals or 
corporations? Specify other:  
 
SAMP_MIX  
3) Was the sample drawn from more than one 
organization? 
1. Yes 
0. No 
If the sample consists of individuals, answer the following questions.  
Otherwise, skip to question #9: 
AGE  
4) Mean Age of Sample (if mean age cannot be 
determined, enter 888) 
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RACE  
5) Predominant Race of sample 
 1. Mostly white 
 2. Mostly black 
 3. Mostly Hispanic 
 4. Mostly Asian 
 5. Mixed, none more than 50% 
 6. Mixed, cannot estimate proportion 
 888. Unknown/Not reported 
SEX  
6) Predominant Sex of sample 
 1. 60% or more male 
 2. 60% or more female 
3. Even mix of male and female 
 888. Unknown/Not reported 
MGMT  
7) Predominant management level of sample: 
 1.  60% or more non-managerial employee 
 2.  60% or more middle managers or supervisors 
3. 60% or more CEO/Executives (or highest-
level employees such as law firm partners) 
4.  Even mix of multiple levels 
5. Other (Specify) 
 888.  Unknown/Not reported 
MGMT2  
7b) Management level of sample—specify other: 
 
PRTCPNT  
8) Who were the participants of the study? 
1. Unemployed students 
2. Working students 
3. Both unemployed and working students 
4. Professionals 
5. Both students and professionals 
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EDUCATION  
9) Predominant education level of sample 
1. 60% or more: High school degree or less 
2. 60% or more : Some college education (or 
currently in college) 
3. 60% or more: College graduates 
4. 60% or more: Some graduate education (or 
currently in graduate program) 
5. 60% or more: Completed graduate degree 
6: Even mix of multiple education levels 
888. Unknown/Not reported 
EMPLENGTH  
10) Length of employment of the target 
population:________ 
 1. No work experience 
 2. Less than 5 years 
 3. Between 5 – 10 years 
 5. More than 10 years 
6. Multiple levels of experience included in 
sample 
888. Unknown/Not reported 
INDUSTRY  
11) From what industry was the sample drawn? (choose 
all that apply) 
1. Agriculture 2. Accounting 
3. Advertising 4. Airline 
5. Banking 6. Biotechnology 
7. 
Computer/Technology 
8. Consumer 
products 
9. Defense 10. Education 
11. Energy 12. Food, beverage, 
or tobacco 
13. Health care 14. Investment 
banking 
15. Legal 16. Manufacturing 
17. Marketing/Business 18. 
Pharmaceuticals 
19. Real Estate 20. Retail 
21. Securities and 
Commodities 
22. Service 
23. Telecommunications 24. Transportation 
888. Unknown/Not 
reported 
25. Other (specify) 
26. Multiple categories (list under IND_OTH) 
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IND_OTH  
11b) From what industry was the sample drawn? Specify 
other: 
 
If the sample consists of corporations, please answer the following 
questions: 
COMPSIZE  
12) Average number of employees in sample companies 
(if UOA is firm and information is not given, record 
888) 
COMPPROF  
13) Average profit of companies in sample (not given = 
888) 
COMPSALES  
14) Average annual sales of companies in sample (not 
given = 888) 
IV. Methods and Procedures 
RANDOM  
1) Was the sample randomly selected? 
1. Yes 
0. No 
888. Unclear or not reported 
SAMPPROC  
2) Sampling procedures 
1. Random probability sample 
2. Stratified random sample 
3. Matched-pairs 
4. Snowball sampling 
5. Convenience sample (drawn from individuals to which 
researchers have easy access) 
6. Secondary data analysis (without specification of 
sampling procedures) 
7. Other (specify)  
SAMPPR_OTH  
2b) Sampling procedures—specify other: 
 
SURVEY  
3) Survey design  
1. Mail 
2. Phone 
3. Face-to-face Interview 
4. Other (specify) 
777. Not applicable (not a survey) 
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SURVEY_OTH  
3b) Survey design—specify other: 
 
CROSSSEC  
4) Is the research design cross-sectional or 
longitudinal? 
1. Cross-sectional (including pooled cross-sections 
or lagged independent variables) 
2. Longitudinal (i.e., the dependent variable is 
measured at more than one point in time to 
assess change over time) 
BIAS  
5) Did the authors assess the differences between 
survey respondents’ and non-respondents’ 
background characteristics? 
1. Yes 
0. No 
777. Not applicable (not a survey) 
BIAS_YES  
5b) If yes, were significant differences found between 
responders’ and nonresponders’ background 
characteristics? 
1. Yes 
0. No 
777. Not applicable 
BIAS_ADD  
5c) If yes, what did the authors do to address these 
differences? 
 
RESPRATE  6) Response rate to survey (777 if not a survey) 
ATTRITION  
7) If longitudinal, rate of attrition (put 777 if not a 
longitudinal panel survey) 
SIGLEVEL  8) Level of statistical significance used (usually .05) 
CONTROL  
9) Nature of control group 
1. Randomly assigned—no treatment 
2. Randomly assigned—alternative treatment 
3. Natural experiment—no treatment 
4. Natural experiment—alternative treatment 
5. Time-series—pre/post 
6. Propensity-score matching/Matched pairs 
7. No control group (not an experimental design 
or not a listed QED) 
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PRETEST  
10) Did the authors assess pre-test differences between 
TX/control groups? 
1. Yes 
0. No 
PRTST_DIFF  
10b) If so, were differences found between groups? 
1. Yes 
0. No 
PRTST_ADD  
10c) If yes, what did the researchers do to address these 
differences? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. Description of Independent Variable 
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TREATMENT  
1) What form did the treatment take?iii
1. Class/training on compliance with standards 
or procedures 
 
 2. Law (including case law) 
 3. Official sanction/Fine (e.g., conviction, 
prosecution, prison) OR punishment avoidance (e.g., 
acquittal) 
4. Regulatory Policy (e.g., inspections, agency 
resources, deregulation) 
16. Non-punitive action by regulatory agency 
(e.g., warning letter, cease and desist order)  
5. Corporate policy (e.g., procedures, employee  
participation)  
6. Corporate structure (e.g., corporate 
governance initiative,  
percent outside members on board) 
7. Compliance program (e.g., internal 
monitoring, voluntary organizational programs 
involving more than education) 
 8. Membership in external professional 
organization 
9. Consultant participation (e.g., accounting 
firm or others) 
10. Unionization/Employee Committees 
11. Workers’ benefits (e.g., workers’ 
compensation) 
12. Organizational climate (e.g., supervisory 
support or punishment by the company) 
13.  Informal sanctions (e.g., bad publicity) 
14. Other (specify) 
15. Multiple treatments involved 
TREAT_DES  
1b) Brief description of treatment:  
 
TREAT_BIN  
1c) Was the independent variable binary or 
continuous? 
1. Binary 
2. Continuous 
TREATCON_DES  
2) Description of continuous independent variable 
measurement: 
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IV_SOURCE  
4) What data sources were used to measure the 
independent variables? (Select all that apply) 
1. Official data 
2. Self-report data (e.g., surveys or interviews) 
3. Observations/site visits of places or 
environments 
4. Other (specify) 
IVSRCE_OTH  
4b) What data sources were used to measure the 
independent variables? Specify other: 
 
CONTROLS  
5) Did the authors control for potentially spurious 
variables? 
1. Yes 
0. No 
VI. Dependent Variable Descriptors 
OUTCM_ACT  
1) Did the outcome describe actual behavior (e.g., 
arrests) or intentions (e.g., hypothetical situations)? 
1. Actual behavior 
2. Intentions/Opinions about behavior/Lab 
setting 
3. Both 
OUTCM_DSC  
1b) Brief description of outcomeiv
 
: 
 
OUTCMDTA  
2) What type of data was used to measure the outcome 
covered on this coding sheet? 
1. Official data 
2. Self-report data (e.g., surveys or interviews) 
3. Observations/site visits of places or 
environments 
4. Other (specify) 
OUTDTA_OTH  
2b) What type of data was used to measure the 
outcome covered on this coding sheet?  Specify other: 
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OUTMSRE  
3) How was the DV measured? 
1. Scale—1 item 
2. Composite 
3. Raw number of violations (or rates: #/unit of 
opportunity) 
4. Dichotomous measure 
5. Other (specify)—e.g., dollar amounts 
OUTMSRE_OTH  
3b) How was the DV measured?  Specify other: 
 
 
OUTMSRE_DES  
4)Description of continuous outcome measure: 
 
ILL_UNETH  
5) Is the DV measured using illegal or unethical 
behavior?v
1. Illegal (e.g., can be sanctioned by law enforcement or 
regulatory sanctions, or is subject to auditing) 
 
2. Unethical (morally ambiguous but not subject to 
sanctions) 
3. Both 
4. Other (specify):  (Unclear whether sanctionable/only 
related to company policies) 
888. Unknown/Not reported 
ILLUNETH_OTH  
5b) Is the DV measured using illegal or unethical 
behavior?  Specify other: 
 
COMP_SOC  
6) Is the victim of the offense the company or general 
society?  
1. Company 
2. Society  
3. Other (specify) 
COMP_SOC_OTH  
6b) Does the behavior affect the company or society, 
according to Akers’ (1977) list? Specify other: 
II. Effect Size Datavi 
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ATT_PROB  
1) Was attrition a problem for this outcome? 
1. Yes 
0. No 
777. Not Applicable (not a panel survey) 
888. Not reported/unknown 
ATT_CASES  
2) If attrition was a problem, how many cases were 
lost? 
ATT_REAS  
3) If attrition was a problem, why were cases lost? 
 
 
RAWDIFF  
4) Raw difference (i.e., means or frequencies) favors 
(i.e. shows more success for): 
 1. Treatment group (or post period) 
 2. Control group (or pre period) 
 3. Neither (exactly equal) 
 888. Unknown 
777. Not applicable 
SIGDIFF  
5) Did a test of statistical significance indicate 
statistically significant differences between either the 
control and treatment groups or the pre and post 
tested treatment group? 
 1. Yes 
 0. No 
 888. Unknown 
 777. Not applicable 
STANDES  
6) Was a standardized effect size reported? 
 1. Yes 
 0. No 
ES  7) If yes, what was the effect size 
ES_PAGE  8) If yes, page number where effect size data is found 
NOES  
9) If no, is there data available to calculate an effect 
size? 
 1. Yes 
 0. No 
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NOES_DATA  
10) Type of data effect size can be calculated from:vii
 1. Means and standard deviations 
 
 2. t-value or z-value 
3. F-value 
 4. Chi-square (df=1) 
 5. Frequencies or proportions (dichotomous) 
 6. Frequencies or proportions (polychotomous) 
 7. Pre and post  
 8. Standardized regression coefficients 
9. Unstandardized regression coefficients 
10. Correlations (Pearson’s r) 
11. Other (specify) 
NOES_OTH  
10b) Type of data effect size can be calculated from—
specify other:   
 
NOES_REG  
10c) If the data presented is an unstandardized 
regression coefficient, what type of regression was 
used? 
1. OLS 
2. Logistic 
3. Tobit 
4. Poisson 
5. Other (specify) 
6. Ordered logit 
NOES_REG2  
10d) If the data presented is an unstandardized 
regression coefficient, what type of regression was 
used? Specify other: 
 
TX_N  11) Treatment group sample sizeviii
CON_N 
 
 11b) Control group sample size 
TX_propN  
12) Proportion of sample in treatment group 
(Tx/Tx+Control) 
CON_propN  
12b) Proportion of sample in control group 
(Con/Tx+Control) 
TXMEAN  12) Treatment group mean (dependent variable) 
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CONMEAN  12b) Control group mean (dependent variable) 
TXSD  
13) Treatment group standard deviation (dependent 
variable) 
CONSD  
14) Control group standard deviation (dependent 
variable) 
SUCCTX_N_a  
15a)  n of treatment group with successful outcome 
SUCCCON_N_c  
15b)  n of control group with successful outcome 
FAILTX_N_b  
16a)  n of treatment group with unsuccessful outcome 
FAILTX_N_d  
16b)  n of control group with unsuccessful outcome 
PROPTX_SUCCa  
17) Proportion of treatment group with successful 
outcome 
PROPCON_SUCCc  
18) Proportion of control group with successful 
outcome 
TVALUE  
19) t-value (for independent/dependent-samples means comparisons 
only) 
TVALUE_P  
19b) t-test p value 
ZVALUE  
20) z-value 
ZVALUE_P  
20b) z-test p value 
FVALUE  
21) F-value 
FVALUE_P  
21b) F-test p value 
CHISQ  
22) Chi-square value (df=1) 
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CHISQ_P  
22b) Chi-square p value 
SD_X  23) Standard deviation of the independent variable 
SD_Y  
24) Standard Deviation of the dependent variable (note: 
for dichotomous dependent variables, this can be calculated using the 
formula √p(1-p)) 
UNSTNDRGS  
25) Unstandardized regression coefficient 
STNDRGSS  
26) Standardized regression coefficient 
PRSONR  27) Pearson’s r 
OTHDATA  
28) Type of data effect size can be calculated from: 
(specify other—actual data) 
III. Conclusions made by the author 
CNCLS_IMM  
1) Did the assessment find evidence for the 
effectiveness of the treatment? (e.g., significant statistical test 
in the hypothesized direction) 
 0. No 
1. Yes 
 2. Not tested 
CNCLS_REL  
2) Did the author(s) conclude there a relationship 
between the corporate crime prevention technique and 
a reduction in illegal corporate activities/violations, 
regardless of significant finding? 
 0. No 
 1. Yes 
2. Can’t tell/Author did not discuss 
CNCLS_ADD  
3)Additional notes about conclusions: 
 
 
UNIQUESAMPLE  
4) Was this sample used in this study used in another 
article included in this meta-analysis? If yes, list other 
study IDs that use this sample.  
 
                                                        
DECISION RULES AND NOTES ABOUT VARIABLES 
i If book or unclear, code from author bio 
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ii For our purposes, we will include studies that examine criminal and regulatory 
violations by corporations or their employees.  The majority of corporate offenses 
are handled be regulatory agencies, like the EPA & OSHA.  Thus, a focus on strictly 
criminal behaviors would limit this study and miss a great deal of corporate 
misconduct.  According to Clinard and Yeager (1980), corporate crime is “any act 
committed by corporations that is punished by the state, regardless of whether it is 
punished under administrative, civil, or criminal law” (p. 16).  This offense-based 
definition encompasses a wide range of behaviors such as antitrust 
offenses, intentionally polluting the environment, unsafe labor 
practices, and tax and securities violations.     
iii We are looking for variables that measure: 
- Extralegal or legal interventions and that are policy-relevant (i.e., can be the 
subject of an intervention).   
o “General organizational climate” is not relevant unless this includes 
specific policies in the organization that affect compliance.   
o We are NOT interested in personality characteristics (e.g., morality) 
or a person’s approval of the law, job, policy, etc.  
- Things we ARE interested in include  
o Civil or criminal laws or sanctions (including civil cases) 
o Ethical or safety policies within the company 
o Internal compliance/monitoring programs 
o Market devices such as shaming (e.g., bad publicity) 
o Membership in external professional organizations that can sanction 
members 
o Internal/external audits 
o Corporate structure, including 
 Insider vs. outsider members on the board of directors 
(including gray and independent directors) 
 Public vs. private ownership 
 Whether CEO is head of the board of directors 
o People’s perceptions of risks (e.g., of getting caught or being 
sanctioned either formally or informally) 
- We are mainly interested in the presence vs. absence of such variables, 
not descriptions about these IVs or gradations/dosage of the treatment (e.g., 
we are not interested in the size of the auditing company). 
o If the independent variable is related to corporate compliance 
programs or something that seems to be of interest, include it only if 
you can dichotomize it and if there is not already a dichotomous 
variable of interest (e.g., company expenditures on compliance—
could be dichotomized if companies report $0 versus non-zero 
values).    
- When an intervention includes multiple components but only has one data 
point, just record one case and list all of the categories of the treatment 
variable under which it could fall, separate by commas. 
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iv Regarding measures of the dependent variable, we are not looking at 
overcompliance in and of itself.   
- If overcompliance is measured, it can be used if compared to noncompliance 
(and should be combined with compliance if applicable).   
- We ARE interested in severity measures (e.g., the amount of money lost, 
number of injuries) as well as compliance vs. noncompliance. 
v An illegal act is one that has been formalized as a law or regulatory statute—i.e., 
you can be sued, cited, or arrested for it. 
- Unethical practices are those that are not punishable under the law but are 
morally questionable. 
vi Decision rules on including ESs: 
- If two or more tables/models are presented on the same IV and same 
operationalization of the DV, include all unique measures of the variables 
of interest. 
- Prioritizing the table/model that 1) includes more IVs of interest and 2) has 
the full (more final) model.  
- If alternative modeling strategies (e.g., OLS as well as Poisson) are used and 
there is no significant difference between the two use the simpler model.    
- After including all of the variables of interest from the final model, include 
any other (not already included) variables of interest from other models that 
may have been dropped from the final model. 
vii Anytime an article has more than one model, NOES_DTA should only have one value and 
there needs to be another case.  There needs to be a new case anytime you have a 
new independent variable, dependent variable, or model (e.g., anytime you 
have data coming from a different place). 
- When both unstandardized and standardized coefficients, just record that you have 
standardized coefficients in NOES_DTA but record both in their appropriate places 
- When both means and t-tests, just record that you have a t-test in NOES_DTA but 
record both in their appropriate places 
- If you have a regression coefficient and descriptive statistics (means, SD), just record 
the regression in NOES_DTA but give all of the information in the appropriate place 
viii For time-series, the baseline/pre-intervention numbers belong under the “control group.”  
The post-test is the treatment group. 
 
 
 
